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國際學碩士學位論文

**Deadlocked FTA Negotiations between Korea and Japan:
Domestic Politics of KJFTA in Japan**

한국과 일본 간의 정체된 FTA 협상에 관한 연구:
한일FTA의 일본 국내정치의 관점으로

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서울대학교 國際大學院

國際地域學科 日本地域學專攻

韓 아 람

**Deadlocked FTA Negotiations
between Korea and Japan:
Domestic Politics of KJFTA in Japan**

A thesis presented by

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To

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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ABSTRACT

A Deadlocked FTA Negotiations between Korea and Japan: Domestic Politics of KJFTA in Japan

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Since 2000s, Japan has been gradually strengthening its drive forces for trade liberalization into a global market. However, it seems that the case of Korea-Japan FTA has been revealed an exceptionally different trend from Japan's recent FTA initiatives under Abe administration and Korea's proactive FTA policies. The KJFTA has not come to an agreement yet since the negotiations have started in 2003 up to now in the mid-2016. This thesis aims to investigate what sort of constraints have been tackled further negotiations of the KJFTA, mainly whether it is caused by political or economic reasons in Japanese society. I would like to examine the current barrier factors in the progress of KJFTA talks concentrating on the Japan's domestic political constraints, which is producing a huge obstacle

to the agreement. Many scholars observe that the issue of non-competitive sectors and Japan's domestic FTA politics, which can be interpreted as the "*iron triangle*" or "*triad alliance*" relationships of the political party (or politicians), bureaucrats and interest groups, have been generating the strongest domestic hurdles to the trade negotiations. Then, what explains the impact of the iron-triangle alliance on the process of KJFTA negotiations? How have these factors materially affected to conflicting issues behind trade negotiations? My thesis pays close attention to the Japan's domestic policymaking process and deals with the recent traces for iron-triangle interaction which are resistant to trade liberalization in the agricultural politics. By doing so, this paper contributes to bring out the issue of Japanese domestic politics, particularly agricultural politics, related to the prolonged KJFTA negotiations as well as analyze it together which has been rarely applied in the analysis yet in this field. Even though the two nations have a long road ahead, it is too early to conclude that the future of KJFTA negotiation is bleak. Most notably, the recent movements of Japan's foreign economic policy under Abe administration show its strong desire for participating either bilateral or multilateral economic talks. Last but not least, PM Abe has insisted on substantial reforms on agricultural politics by weakening the influence of agriculture cooperatives to trade negotiations and it has been successfully done so far. Yet, these efforts are still tangential to the success of KJFTA negotiations. Against all

odds, when the Korean and Japanese government achieve the agreement of KJFTA, it will definitely bring out a new momentum beyond current diplomatic impasse for the bilateral relations, and even for East Asian economic integration.

Keywords: Korea-Japan FTA, Japan's FTA Politics, Iron Triangle, Agricultural Politics (*Nogyo Seiji*), LDP, MAFF, Nokyo, Segmented Corporatism, Organized Vote.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the early 2000s, Northeast Asian countries have been pursuing bilateral and trilateral FTAs within the region. In 1998, “*The Action Agenda for the Partnership of Japan and Korea toward the 21st century*” was the first to put forward by Japan and Korea, proposing a broad range of cooperation and policy coordination between two countries, including economy, cultural exchange and security (Ito, 2005). South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung’s visit to Japan in October 1998 improved relations to the stage that the plan of Korea-Japan Free Trade Agreement (hereafter “KJFTA”) began to be quietly investigated in both countries. Then, the Korea-Japan FTA officially started to have its discussions in December 2002. Afterwards, the Korea-Japan summit was held in Seoul and President Kim Dae-Jung and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro had a talk for Korea-Japan economic alliance. As the outcome of talks, they agreed with setting up a Korea-Japan joint study group consisting of industrial, bureaucratic, and academic fields of economic experts. Both countries initially aimed at finishing up the talks by 2005, but the negotiation came to a standstill after the six-round talks on November 2004. Surprisingly, the goal of economic alliance has not been realized even at the present time of 2016.

By contrast, the efforts in order to achieve the Korea-China FTA (hereafter “KCFTA”) came to fruition in last 2014. The practical KCFTA negotiations started

in 2012 and it had been made steady progress and finally reached its agreement in two years. With the conclusion of the KCFTA as being a new momentum, the relationship between Korea and China has been gradually deepened its ties in the cultural, economic and political sphere. Moreover, with a possibility of regional economic integration in East Asia like the European integration case, the talks of trilateral trade agreement among Korea, Japan and China also has been well advanced. The joint research on the Korea-China-Japan trilateral FTA (hereafter “KCJFTA”) has been developed since the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the study on the possibility of Northeast Asian FTA in 2002. Most recently, three countries had the 10th business working-level consultations regarding the KCJFTA on last April 5th-8th in Seoul. In last November 2015, China, Japan and Korea held their first trilateral summit since after 2012’s meeting, and the trilateral declaration took an optimistic view of the thorny relationship between three countries. Most notably, the three leaders unanimously agreed to continue their work toward regional economic integration by making further efforts towards the acceleration of the trilateral FTA negotiations¹.

An FTA with Korea is widely perceived to produce significant political and regional initiative incentives to Japan as well as much broader package to

¹ Refer to Foreign Affairs “With Trilateral Summit, China-Japan-Korea Cooperation ‘Completely Restored’” (November 3rd, 2015). <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/with-trilateral-summit-china-japan-korea-cooperation-completely-restored/>

redevelop Korea-Japan relations for a new fresh start in this century (Katada and Solis, 2009). A number of preceding studies regarding economic effects of KJFTAs have fully analyzed throughout the whole economic and trade sectors. As many observes that the negotiations of Korea-Japan FTA have been more proceeding with political difficulties rather than a matter of economic concerns. Both free trade policies of the Korean and Japanese government had experiences of strong domestic opposition from the non-competitive sectors, especially on agricultural sector. However, as Hironori Sasada also questioning, what really explains the reasons why the Japanese government often has been struggling to implement its free trade policies as being defensive, while the Korean government succeeded in achieving a number of free trade policies despite a similar level of intense opposition (Sasada, 2013)? This research paper aims to explore this entangled puzzle from the political aspects of domestic FTA policymaking, represented as one pillar of two-level game factors, particularly from the Japanese side. With the questions such as “how could the Korea-China Free Trade Agreement conclude its achievement so smoothly and rapidly, but why did it not take place in the case of Korea-Japan Free Trade Agreement yet?”, this paper again purposes to demonstrate the hurdles to the negotiations for the KJFTA, mainly concentrating on Japan’s domestic political constraints. Particularly, my thesis has an academic significance in investigating the recent traces for iron-triangle

interaction which are resistant to trade liberalization in Japan's agriculture sector for the last decade, in order to figure out the causes of the deadlocked KJFTA.

My motive for this research stems from the reality of continuous political and diplomatic conflicts between two Korea and Japan for several decades. Adding to turbulent circumstances surrounding East Asia, China, as a new global power, has continuously consolidated its position within and without the East Asian region, competing with Japan and the United States. Currently, three countries, Korea, China and Japan, show their relationships as friends and enemies simultaneously depending upon the events and issues. I would like to find a way to break through the current political deadlocks and further develop in various diplomatic levels of cooperation between two or three countries. With this viewpoint, I would like to bring and apply one international cooperation theory into the current situation in East Asia region to find out a better way to cooperate the relations. Among others, the liberal-institutionalist theory clearly explains on the importance of economic cooperation in international politics. The theory focuses on domestic decision-making structure, thereby it emphasizes that developing economic relations would be an easier way to lead a higher level of cooperation between countries than starting from political cooperation. Consequently, I came up with the idea of research more about an economic way of cooperation between China, Japan and Korea. Meanwhile, the KJFTA issue

drew my attention from the fact that it has been struggling more than a decade, showing no remarkable progress compared to other FTA negotiations.

In brief, puzzles for my studies would be discussed in the paper as follows: Although the case of Korea-China FTA also faced similar political and diplomatic conflicts between two nations, however, the negotiations dramatically concluded in last December 2014. Then, how could the Korea-China FTA reach an agreement so smoothly and rapidly beyond continuous political stalemates since its negotiations started in 2012? Why could not the case of Korea-Japan FTA follow the similar successful route until now? Which factor well explains the real obstacle in the process of Korea-Japan FTA negotiations? Is this because of the irrationality of economic effects? Or political obstacles between two countries? This study tries to provide proper descriptions to answer these puzzles with an analysis of Japan's domestic constraints in the FTA policymaking process, which is creating defensive FTA strategy and strong opposition from domestic groups against the agreement of FTAs including KJFTA.

CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND OF KOREA-JAPAN FTA

1.1. Current Progress and Past Discontinuation

From the viewpoint of geographic closeness and cultural similarities, for almost 30 years since the normalization of diplomatic ties has made, current bilateral relations between Korea and Japan have fallen far short of expectations due to various issues acting as barriers. These include the territorial disputes over the Dokdo Islands, differences in historical recognition such as the comfort women issue, and on trade issues, Korea's huge trade deficit with Japan originated from its high degree of economic dependency. In consideration of economic ties as a great trading partner, on the other hand, Korea and Japan also have been actively seeking to pursue a bilateral FTA between them. Talks on a KJFTA started in 1998 when President Kim Dae-Jung and then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi proposed the "Action Plans for a New Korea-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century". This suggested the promotion of trade, investment, and cultural exchanges as the main subjects of cooperation. As the first concrete step, two governments agreed to conduct the joint studies on the economic effects of the KJFTA in October 1998.

Table 1 shows a detailed timeline of the negotiations of the KJFTA thus far. In overall, for about last 17 years, the negotiations had discontinued mainly two times: 1) First disconnection happened during the 2005-2008 period, and 2)

next one applies to the period between 2012 and now. In short, from the past negotiation experiences of the KJFTA, the negotiations have been stuck in political deadlock due to the conflicting views of various interest groups in both societies. The biggest obstacles stemmed from domestic criticism in both countries. To be specific, Korean citizens have raised the problem of Korea's high-level of dependence on trade and its high possibility of trade deficit toward Japan. These concerns have also led to a certain level of backlash from interest groups in both countries. For a long time, the people of both Korea and Japan are stimulated negative national feelings due to recent unceasing historical and political controversies and its led-antagonistic relationship. Consequently, political parties and civic groups in both nations continuously raise a negative voice for the KJFTA. Thus, one can conclude that domestic political reasons are creating the biggest cause blocking a further progress of internal and external negotiations towards the achievement of Korea-Japan FTA.

Table 1. Timeline of Korea-Japan FTA Negotiations²

June.25, 2012	3rd round of 「Manager-Level Consultation on the Korea-Japan FTA」 (Tokyo, Japan)
May.29~30, 2012	2nd round of 「Manager-Level Consultation on the Korea-Japan FTA」 (Seoul, Korea)

² Refer to “FTA-website” of the Korean government
(<http://www.fta.go.kr/main/situation/kfta/lov7/jp/1/>), translated by author.

Apr.25~26, 2012	1st round of 「Manager-Level Consultation on the Korea-Japan FTA」 (Tokyo, Japan)
May. 9, 2011	2nd round of「Director-General-Level Consultation on the Korea-Japan FTA」(Seoul, Korea)
Sep. 16, 2010	1st round of「Director-General-Level Consultation on the Korea-Japan FTA」(Tokyo, Japan)
Dec. 21, 2009	4th round of Working Level Consultations (Seoul, Korea)
Jul.1, 2009	3rd round of Working Level Consultations (Tokyo, Japan)
Dec.4, 2008	2nd round of Working Level Consultations (Seoul, Korea)
Jun.25, 2008	1st round of Working Level Consultations: To consider and create a favorable environment for the resumption of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (hereinafter Working Level Consultations), (Tokyo, Japan)
Nov.1~3, 2004	6th round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Tokyo, Japan)
Aug.23~25, 2004	5th round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Kyungju, Korea)
Jun.23~25, 2004	4th round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Tokyo, Japan)
Apr.26~28, 2004	3rd round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Seoul, Korea)
Feb.23~25, 2004	2nd round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Tokyo, Japan)
Dec.22, 2003	1st round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Seoul, Korea)
Oct.20, 2003	Korea-Japan agree to launch the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations
Jul.2002~Oct. 2003	Joint Study Group meetings
Mar, 2002	Korea-Japan agreed to launch the Joint Study Group for the Korea-Japan FTA
Dec.1998~Apr.	Study group meetings

2000	
Nov. 1998	Korea and Japan agreed to launch the 21 st century Korea-Japan Economic Relations Study Group

Japan has recently shown much more consolidated political conservative forces after entering the Shinzo Abe's administration term. Fortunately, it is not likely to make Japanese political environment harder to resolve the deadlocked FTA issues, since current Japanese Prime Minister Abe strongly pushes forward economic liberalization and proactive trade negotiations as his one of the growth strategies. Japan also has to race for a position of leader with China's rise of power within the East Asia region, and furthermore one should not overlook the alliance relation with the United States. Surprisingly, in December 2014, the Korea-China FTA dramatically reached its agreement during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) period. Most recently, the last trilateral summit among three China, Japan, and Korea in November 2015 became another optimistic sign to confirm the willingness for a higher level of economic cooperation between three countries (Foreign Affairs, 2015). As a result of the efforts, the negotiations of trilateral FTA between Korea, China and Japan has been proceeding smoothly. These dynamic changes occurred in East Asia might strongly stimulate the Japanese government to activate talks with Korea for further progress of KJFTA negotiations in any ways.

Political Disruptions

Turning back to the issue of politics, one should pay close attention to the discontinuation during the process of KJFTA negotiations are closely interrelated with the period of political diplomatic struggles between Korea and Japan. For example, in last 2005, the council of Japan's Shimane Prefecture declared February 22nd as their "Takeshima Day" to celebrate the island as Japanese territory, which resulted in many Koreans' antagonism and resistance to Japan. Adding to the South Korea's anger to the territorial dispute, multiple visits by a group of Japanese lawmakers and prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine, which pay tribute to convicted war criminals, also produced fierce protests from Korean as well as Chinese people. In particular, Junichiro Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine and paid respects "six times" during only his term as Prime Minister of Japan, starting on August 13th, 2001. As a result, the heads of Korea and China refused to meet with PM Koizumi, and consequently there were no mutual visits between Chinese and Japanese leaders after October 2001 and between South Korean and Japanese leaders after June 2005. President of South Korea Roh Moo-Hyun had suspended all summit meetings between South Korea and Japan until 2008 when he resigned from the office (Kang, 2004). Recently, current PM Shinzo Abe has made multiple visits to the Yasukuni Shrine again since 2013. This caused a huge diplomatic stalemate to have further conversations and cooperation

between two countries. In short, due to the characteristics of political sensitivity, the periods of political and diplomatic conflicts between Korea and Japan, exactly coincided with each time two parties encounter obstacles in the FTA negotiation process.

In this circumstances, the improvement of domestic political environments should be the foremost condition in order to overcome current discontinuation of the KJFTA. Economic divergences through liberalization such as the issues of agricultural sector and job insecurity are inevitable to resolve, however political or diplomatic conflict resolutions are probably much more essential to reach the final agreement of KJFTA. In fact, Japan recognizes the necessity of bilateral FTAs including the KJFTA at the international level, regardless of consistent domestic oppositions. The problem is here, domestic national consensus towards the FTA has not fully built yet in Japanese society. Even though Japan recently has been emphasizing its drive force to enhance economic liberalization into global market, it seems that the KJFTA still has many hurdles to overcome toward reaching to finalize the agreement. In this regard, author sums up the deadlock on both international and domestic level of struggles generating obstacles to KJFTA, as seen in **Table 2**. This paper contributes to bring up the issue of Japanese domestic policymaking related to the KJFTA negotiation process as well as analyze it together which has been rarely applied in the analysis

in the field.

Table 2. Determinants to Achievement of KJFTA

	Domestic	International
Political	<p>“Iron triangle” in Japan’s policymaking (LDP, bureaucrats, interest groups)</p> <p>No consensus-building</p> <p>Negative public opinion</p>	<p>Political tensions between Korea and Japan,</p> <p>Turbulent East Asia</p> <p>e.g. Historical and territorial issues, diplomatic stalemate</p>
Economic	<p>Oppositions from less beneficiary groups</p> <p>e.g. Non-competitive sectors such as Agriculture, Fisheries, etc.</p>	<p>“East Asia” vs. “Asia-Pacific”</p> <p>Competition for a regional initiative: China vs. the US,</p> <p>e.g. TPP, AIIB, FTAAP, etc.</p>

1.2. Korea and Japan's National Strategy for FTA in Trade Negotiations

The FTA Policies of the Korean Government

Before addressing the domestic constraints of KJFTA in Japan, I would like to examine each government's national strategy and its stance for their FTA strategies. By doing so, it clarifies the difference between the Korean and Japanese government in FTA countermeasures. According to the Ministry of Trade Industry and Energy³, since 2003, the Korean government has been aggressively pushed for FTAs having a strategic approach toward a FTA hub of East Asia. The major characteristics of Korea's FTA strategy is to conclude FTAs in a very short time compared to any other countries, with the joint collaboration of ministries. In general, the Korean government aims for a comprehensive and high-level of FTAs with trading partners. There are enough reasons to accelerate its initiative toward proactive FTA strategy from the Korean government side. For Korea, it is necessary to position itself as a key player in the framework of the burgeoning East Asian regionalism (Choi, 2004). As a middle-income country with little leverage against trading partners, Korea aims to get the maximum benefits by forming FTAs with advanced, powerful economies like China, Japan and the United States. For these reasons, the Korean government has enough motives to

³ Refer to "*Korea's FTA strategy*" by the Ministry of Trade Industry and Trade (MTIT) of Republic of Korea. (<http://www.fta.go.kr/main/situation/kfta/psum/>)

actively push for the achievement of KJFTA.

In brief, in comparison with Japan, the Korean government has been aggressively pursuing trade liberalization for her economy and has already concluded a number of FTAs including major world economies such as the United States, the EU and China. The Korea's domestic political environment for trade negotiations is quite similar to that of Japan. The business leaders and conservative interest groups insist that trade liberalization policy is vital to the Korean economy considering its high dependency on trade exports. Besides, the Korean government also had faced extreme resistances toward trade liberalization from few progressives and agricultural organizations (Sasada, 2013). Nonetheless, the Korean government has succeeded to sign and ratify a number of FTAs beyond domestic intense opposition against trade liberalization policies. This is feasible primarily because of the political structure that allows the president to influence strong leadership, a lack of peak organization for farmers' groups like Japan, and an absence of political system which highlights the influence of farmers' votes. In other words, the impact of agricultural votes is limited in the Korea's trade policymaking process, and thus, the national leader has been able to overcome the domestic oppositions against controversial FTAs.

The FTA Policies of the Japanese Government

Japan's rapid economic growth has significantly benefited from the GATT rule system, which was a major multilateral trade regime in the postwar period of 1960-1980s. Unlike the trend of international economy, the Japanese government traditionally has shown little interest in bilateral or regional free trade agreements. This fact largely caused by Japanese domestic constraints with most stemming from a globally uncompetitive and politically influential agricultural sector, which is also being a key political base of the Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter "LDP") as the aggregation of major conservatives for long decades in Japan. Besides, due to the highly fragmented and dysfunctional Japanese foreign economic policymaking, Japan became a late-comer in the international movement of actively pursuing FTAs. Still later, Japan cautiously managed its trade liberalization commitments until 2000s. The Japanese government has selected its FTA partners only having relatively small economies and small agricultural sector, for example, Singapore and Mexico as her first and second FTA partners. In the 2000s, Japan eventually started to show its emerging interest in bilateral FTAs and its concerns about the multilateral trade negotiations with global trends.

However, despite the new changes in Japanese government's stance, it is not enough to define Japan's foreign economic policy considering as proactive strategy. Rather, it is an alternative measure to prioritize its control on the trade

negotiation agenda by negotiating with smaller countries as well as to limit the agricultural concessions and avoid domestic backlash. Moreover, in domestic affairs, there was a request (so-called “*naiatsu*”) for FTA participation from Japanese big businesses in order to avoid disadvantages of trade diversion (Solis, 2015). More recently, Japan’s decision of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (hereafter “TPP”) brings a new momentum for Japan’s trade politics by relocating its strategy from bilateralism to “multilateralism”. The Japanese government has changed its trade strategy from focusing bilateral relations in 2000s and to recent efforts to illuminate multilateral trade regimes (Solis, 2015). According to Pekkanen, Solis and Katada (2007) in their studies, joining the TPP raises Japan’s credibility by raising the possibility of economic, legal and political externalities for reaccelerating FTA initiatives, such as in the cases of KCJ trilateral FTA and Japan-EU FTA. Today, Japan aims to use the more ambitious commitments using TPP to disseminate their rules or norms on regional economic integration.

In general, trade liberalization rate for Japan is lower than its partner countries (Ito, 2007), so developing economies had to accept the uneven terms. Japan has used a variety of mechanisms to limit the extent of agricultural concessions including outright exclusions, renegotiations, and tariff rate quotas (Solis, 2005). Again, it is notable that Japan was a latecomer to FTA. There was no FTA in Japan until January 2002 when the Japanese-Singapore Economic

Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) was concluded. Before the “White Paper on International Trade” (1999) was issued by the Ministry of Economic and International Trade (hereafter “METI”) as the first official document advocating FTAs, Japan had remained negative on FTAs because the Japanese government was always advocating the GATT-WTO rule system which stands for world-wide liberalization. However, as FTAs became increasingly popular from the mid-1990s, the Japanese government had to change its trade policy for market liberalization (Yoshida, 2004). In short, with increasing pressure for competitive liberalization, Japan could no longer maintain its previous position and changed into a more pragmatic trade strategy. A bilateral agreement with Australia in 2014 was Japan’s first experience with an industrialized country and a major agricultural exporter. Yet, the most important part of agricultural exports was highly protected by Japanese negotiators. .

According to Japan’s FTA strategy by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in Japan⁴, the government will raise its FTA ratio from current 19% to 70% by 2018, by promoting economic partnership as a stepping stone of global economic activities. Therefore, the government will draw up new rules in Asia-Pacific region by working positively on the TPP negotiations and use these rules as a rationale

⁴ Refer to 外務省. “日本のFTA戦略” (October, 2012).

for the discussions of rulemaking for the Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), along with a wide-range of economic cooperation such as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the KCJ trilateral FTA. Specifically, for a FTA with Korea, the Japanese government repeatedly clarifies that Japan is fully aware of its political importance and significances of a deep-level of economic interdependence through the KJFTA. The Abe administration recently announced that the negotiation should start again for building a firm bilateral relationship at the earliest opportunity. It is also clear that Japan wants to bring up the issue of KJFTA as the next stage for East Asian regional cooperation with a common vision for the East Asia economic community, not just pushing for a bilateral trade agreement itself.

CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL REVIEWS ON KOREA-JAPAN FTA

2.1. Review on IPE theories and Japan's Trade Politics

The field of international political economy has addressed the issue of the challenges what they face, such as understanding the simultaneous interaction of domestic and international factors in determining foreign economic policies and international economic outcomes. To begin with, the following paragraphs will review some theoretical works of international political economy, particularly stressing on the domestic political factors in determining trade negotiations amid changing international environment. Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (1996) mainly argues that one can no longer understand domestic politics, without comprehending the nature of the linkages between national economies and the global economy and changes in-between. Since economics and politics are so closely linked, domestic politics tells us some critical signs of its impact of the global economy. Another article by Helen Milner (1992), also explains that consideration of domestic politics is essential to understand international cooperation between countries for following reasons: one indicates that domestic factors tell us how preferences are aggregated and national interests are constructed; another one points out that domestic politics also helps to clarify the national strategies what and how states adopt to realize their goals. Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff (1996) also claim that domestic politics comprehensively

influences the outcome of international negotiations. On top of that, their argument sheds more lights on the role of “interest groups” in the domestic policymaking process as well as in international negotiations situated in an uncertain environment. To sum up, these works similarly gives enough reasoning that it is worth discovering “domestic politics” factor specifically, when discussing the international level of political exchanges or trade negotiations and their intertwined characteristics stories in two-level game.

In Japan’s foreign policymaking, domestic political factors also have the significant roles of selecting foreign policy, especially for trade liberalization. Saori Katada and Mireya Solis (2010) reveal that domestic politics is a key to resolve the puzzle of Japanese foreign policy decision-making. Both the domestic actors’ rationale for mobilization and lobbying is essential to understand the government’s foreign policy activism. More recent study by Solis (2010) investigates that Japan’s domestic political determinants, specifically examining the influence of domestic political institutions through the principal-agent model. The scholar explains that the domestic politics of Japanese trade policymaking is changeable depending on the intensity of lobbying by business and agricultural sectors in Japan and the degree of centralization of domestic policymaking process. Therefore, the domestic preconditions for trade liberalization in Japan can either alleviating domestic oppositions from non-competitive sectors or putting a limit

to the iron-triangle politics in policy decision-making.

With these arguments, my paper primarily figures out how the domestic backlash and Japanese politics have relevance to each other in the discussion of non-competitive sectors in KJFTA negotiations, and then examines how it really affects to the deadlock on the process of KJFTA negotiations. There are various contributions of studying the characteristics of Japanese foreign policymaking by such as an bureaucratic-dominance approach, a one-party dominance model, a power elitist model, a iron-triangle alliance, patterned pluralism and so on. A popular example would be Tsuji Kiyooki in his article of “*Shinpan Nihon Kanryosei no Kenkyu*” (1969)⁵, Chalmers Johnson in the work of “*MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the growth of industrial policy*” (1982)⁶, and T. J. Pempel’s article of “*The Bureaucratization of Policymaking in Postwar Japan*” (1974)⁷, all asserting that the influence of bureaucracy dominates the administrative and legislative groups as the most influential actor in Japanese policymaking. On the other hand, Gerald Curtis’s “*The Japanese Way of Politics*” (1988), Pempel’s another book of “*The Unbundling of ‘Japan, Inc.’: The changing dynamics of Japanese policy formation*” (1987)⁸, and Scheiner Ethan’s article of “*Democracy*

⁵ Tsuji, Kiyooki. *Shinpan Nihon Kanryosei no Kenkyu*. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. 1969.

⁶ Johnson, Chalmers. *MITI and the Japanese miracle: the growth of industrial policy: 1925-1975*. Stanford University Press, 1982.

⁷ Pempel, T. J. "The bureaucratization of policymaking in postwar Japan." *American Journal of Political Science* (1974): 647-664.

⁸ Pempel, T. J. "The Unbundling of" Japan, Inc.": The Changing Dynamics of Japanese Policy

without Competition in Japan: Opposition failure in a one-party dominant state" (2006)⁹ put more emphasis on LDP's party dominance and growing influence of party politicians in Japan's postwar politics. Later studies dealt with such as the power-elite model of both bureaucrats and politicians, iron-triangle relationship among political party, bureaucracy, and interest group, and patterned pluralism which analyzes the triad alliance actors as whole. My research focus is specifically centered on the "iron-triangle" alignments in policymaking process to see how three players affect to the fate of Japan's trade policies.

Surrounding Korea and Japan, there are numerous international political matters and some are closely interrelated with the issue of the KJFTA. The FTA is not only connected to economic concerns, it is also often regarded as political or diplomatic exchanges between two nations. Accordingly, political disputes often tackle into the development of further economic cooperation for Korea and Japan, like who continue strained relations for a long period of time. As Naoko Munataka (2015) suggested in her study, Korea and Japan commonly share many political and economic interests, such as historical disputes with neighboring countries, a diplomatic impasse represented as a halt of the Korea-Japan summit, concurrent several economic cooperation talks (such as TPP, RCEP, and the trilateral FTA),

Formation." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 13.2 (1987): 271-306.

⁹ Scheiner, Ethan. *Democracy without competition in Japan: Opposition failure in a one-party dominant state*. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

and its led-economic rivalry position. These international political constraints control whether the FTA can be achieved or not, even during the process of FTA negotiations. With this view, the author asserts that if Japan seriously aims to promote economic integration actively in the region, it must resolve its historical issues with neighboring countries. For these reasons, Japanese political leaders have to play a significant role in creating a mutual understanding based on these differences for their national interests. However, more fundamental factors are grounded on domestic politics generating a deadlock to discontinue the negotiations. The point is, one can finally have a chance to find the answer keys to resolve the reasons for suspension among domestic structural elements of Japan's trade policymaking.

2.2. Overview Analysis of Economic Effects

The economic analysis of KJFTA negotiations has been conducted by a number of proceeding researches in terms of economic benefits of each Korean and Japanese economy. However, there are some differences among studies depending on economic models and data individually used, so the conclusion shows varied outcomes of economic effects. This section simply examines those advanced researches and what part of the industries in Korea and Japan has been controversial topics in KJFTA negotiations thus far. To examine the overall economic effects of KJFTA¹⁰, it is advisable to consider the economic analysis at two levels, macro-level and micro-level, separately and as a whole.

Macroeconomic Effects of KJFTA

KIEP & IDE Joint Study Group¹¹ published research findings of economic effects of KJFTA in 2000 after their two-years study. The economic impact was estimated by each static effect (short-term) and dynamic effect (long-term). The static effect means without changes like capital accumulation, whereas the dynamic effect includes the movement of capital and technology. According to the research findings (**Table 3**), the static effect by KIEP's analysis represents all

¹⁰ Refer to 鄭成春(2011) modified and translated by author.

¹¹ KIEP & IDE stands for: KIEP (The Korea Institute International Economic Policy) and IDE (Institute of Developing Economy) of Japan.

negative (welfare level, GDP, foreign trade index) to Korean economy. On the other hand, the identical effects to Japanese economy indicates all positive figures. This results signify that Korea will incur loss after signing KJFTA at least for the short-time period. The research results by IDE is pretty much identical to KIEP one's. The sole difference is, although there are positive impacts to Korea's GDP and welfare-level in the short-run, it was just close to zero-level.

Regarding the dynamic effect, it is expected that the productivity will be increased according to the free movement of capital, human, and technology. So the dynamic effect will bring positive outcome in Korea's GDP, welfare level, and foreign index toward the world. But, both KIEP and IDE assess Korea's foreign trade index toward Japan will be worsening in the long-term. This means KJFTA will bring an increase of imports from Japan rather than exports to Japan and it will not improve in the long run. Certainly, the study confirms the foreign trade index of both countries through a FTA will not improve.

Table 3. Economic Effects of KJFTA (KIEP&IDE Joint Study Group, 2000)					
		Static effects		Dynamic effects	
		KIEP	IDE	KIEP	IDE
Korea	Welfare level (%)	-0.19	0.34	11.43	7.09
	GDP (%)	-0.07	0.06	2.88	8.67
	Foreign trade index toward Japan (\$ billion)	-60.9	- 38.85	-4.4	-24.6
	Foreign trade index toward the world (\$ billion)	-15.43	-2.7	30.14	408
Japan	Welfare level (%)	0.14	0.03	-	9.29
	GDP (%)	0.04	0	-	10.44
	Foreign trade index toward Japan (\$ billion)	60.9	38.85	-	24.6
	Foreign trade index toward the world (\$ billion)	-	54.79	-	182
Source: MOFA (2003) “Korea-Japan FTA Joint Study Report.”					

The economic effects of KJFTA to Korean economy (**Table 4**) indicates inconsistent result by each research. Studies by Japanese researchers (IDE, ERINA, Urata & Abe) shows a tendency of estimating KJFTA's led positive effect, while Korea's study (KIEP) exhibits a negative effect to Korean economy. The difference might contain a country's strategy for trade negotiations to gain some concessions during the negotiation process. In the late 2000s, KIEP research findings show a positive effect to GDP and welfare-level.

Table 4. Economic Effects of KJFTA to Korean Economy (KIEP, 2008)				
	GDP (%)	Welfare change (%)	Foreign trade index toward Japan (\$ billion)	Foreign trade index toward the world (\$ billion)
KIEP (2000)	-0.07	-0.19	-60.9	-15.4
IDE (2000)	0.06	0.34	-41.9	-17.1
Scally & Gilbert (2001)	-0.28	-	-	0.1
Nakajima & Kwon (2001)	0.02	-	-72.6	-15.3
ERINA (2001)	Static: 0.29, Dynamic: 1.09	Static: 18.1 (\$ billion), Dynamic: 39.7 (\$ billion)	Static: -9.82, Dynamic: -3.01	-
KIEP (2002)	0.02	-0.24	-	-
Urata & Abe (2004)	0.27	0.55	-2.06	-
Source: KIEP (2008a) "한일, 한중일 FTA 를 어떻게 볼 것인가?"				

According to KIEP (2008b) research (**Table 5**), assuming the Korea-US FTA and the Korea-EU FTA in effect, the economic prospects of KJFTA presents positive index of GDP (static: 0.13%, capital-saving: 0.73%) and welfare-level (static: \$6.3 billion, capital-saving: \$23.7 billion). The results of KIEP (2010) analysis, with use of the latest data (GTAP Ver. 7.1), also acquired similar that of 2008 in dynamic model (GDP: 0.59%, welfare-level: \$29 billion). Thanks to the agreement of FTAs with US and EU, the economic impacts of KJFTA will see positive effect even in the short-run along with the global FTA network. Compared

to the Korea-China FTA, however, the economic effects of KJFTA is identified as relatively small. The KIEP (2010) study confirms that the effects of Korea-China FTA has double in GDP growth and three times in welfare-level.

Table 5. Economic Effects of KJFTA (KIEP, 2008)							
	GDP		Welfare level	Exports to Japan		Imports from Japan	
	Rate of increase	Increased amount	Increased amount	Rate of increase	Increased amount	Rate of increase	Increased amount
Static model (complete opening)	0.13	5.87	6.29	20.51	30.32	33.92	84.26
Capital-saving model (complete opening)	0.73	32.35	23.74	21.62	32.79	34.62	86.59
Source: KIEP (2008b) “한일 FTA 체결의 효과분석 및 협상전략수립을 위한 정책방향.”							

Microeconomic Effects of KJFTA

In microeconomic effects, the situation is worse than macro-level. According to KIEP (2008), when Korea and Japan remove their tariffs completely, the domestic production will decrease in industries such as chemistry, rubber, plastic, steel and metal, transportation, and machinery, and consequently trade balance between two countries will pretty much worsen (**Table 6-1&6-2**). In sum, at the micro-level, the effects will be varied depending upon industries.

Table 6-1. Industrial Effect of KJFTA (Static effect)							
		Rate of increase (%)			Increased amount (\$ million)		
		Domestic productio n	Exports to Japan	Imports from Japan	Domestic productio n	Exports to Japan	Imports from Japan
Agricu lture	Rice	0.99	-6.67	0	139.4	-0.1	0
	Grains, Fruits, Vegetables	1.23	22.8	31.46	137.8	88.6	2.8
	Meat, Dairy	2.26	777.05	75.17	293.9	142.2	11.2
	Grocery	2.74	169.64	169.64	820.6	765.5	275.5
	Forestry, Fishery	1.62	71.79	71.79	52.8	17.8	62.6
Manuf acturin g	Mining	-0.58	38.13	38.13	-9.9	-0.2	6.1
	Textile, Fabric	1.94	81.64	81.64	700.2	915.2	421.6
	Chemistry, Rubber, Plastic	-0.1	37.66	37.66	-86	584.4	1680.7
	Steel, Metal	-1.21	22.21	22.21	-668.1	100.1	812
	Transportati on	-0.54	49.79	49.79	-314.9	0.3	469.2
	Electronics	1.08	11.39	11.39	713.8	88.7	714.3
	Machinery	-1.86	44.71	44.71	-1324.9	42	3198.7
	Etc	-0.06	49.91	49.91	-25.8	287.1	771.7
Source: KIEP (2008) “한일 FTA 체결의 효과분석 및 협상전략수립을 위한 정책방향.”							

Table 6-2. Industrial Effect of KJFTA (Dynamic effect)							
		Rate of increase (%)			Increased amount (\$ million)		
		Domestic productio n	Exports to Japan	Imports from Japan	Domestic productio n	Exports to Japan	Imports from Japan
Agricu lture	Rice	1.46	-6.25	0	205	-0.1	0
	Grains, Fruits, Vegetables	1.49	22.02	32.76	158.1	92.5	1.9
	Meat, Dairy	2.88	772.33	76	364.1	159.1	7.6
	Grocery	3.3	69.77	171.22	987	831.2	257
	Forestry, Fishery	2.15	19.59	73.15	71.4	17.2	65.1
Manuf acturin g	Mining	0.12	-0.73	39.63	2	-0.1	6.5
	Textile, Fabric	2.53	91.86	82.53	965.4	953.8	438.3
	Chemistry, Rubber, Plastic	0.48	20.88	38.55	446.5	610.7	1726.8
	Steel, Metal	-0.44	7.27	22.95	-247.1	115.4	848.2
	Transportati on	-0.02	0.68	50.32	-13.4	1.6	477.2
	Electronics	1.93	2.82	12.1	1303.2	133.6	767.6
	Machinery	-0.98	3.48	45.58	-712.5	63.8	3273.4
	Etc	0.49	28.16	50.63	207.5	300.1	789.4
Source: KIEP (2008) "한일 FTA 체결의 효과분석 및 협상전략수립을 위한 정책방향."							

The other analysis regarding the total effect of the FTA in Korea by Inkyo Cheong (2000) contends an expectation of a production expansion for Korea's major industries as well as a production contraction for its primary industries. In specific, the transport equipment, machinery, electric and electronic, and steel industries as Korea's major businesses will see the most significant gains from FTA with annual growth rates of 5 to 13%. **Table 7** shows for the primary

industries and the effects of the FTA will be minimal with only a slight increase of 0.2% for both forestry and fisheries production and a small decline in agricultural production (Cheong, 2000). Unlike serious concerns of economic loss, particularly on agricultural, fishery, and textile sectors in both Korea and Japan, the reality might not too negative to see the benefits from the bilateral FTA. Rather, one can assume that there are sufficient reasons for having the KJFTA throughout the whole trade sectors in times of a higher economic interdependence between Korea and Japan.

Table 7. Effects of a Korea-Japan FTA on Production by Industries (%)¹²

	Static Effects	Dynamic Effects	Total
Agriculture	0.15	-0.21	-0.06
Food Processing	1.05	0.19	1.24
Fisheries	0.02	0.15	0.17
Forestry	0.24	-0.01	0.23
Mineral Resource	-0.3	-0.34	-0.64
Non-ferrous Metals	-0.93	0.67	-0.26
Beverages & Tobacco	-2.38	0.91	-1.47
Textiles	0.69	-3.26	-2.57
Apparel	8.75	-4.16	4.59
Leather Goods	9.56	-7.2	2.36
Wood & Pulp	-0.3	0.71	0.41
Paper & Printing	-0.49	0.13	-0.36
Chemical Industry	-0.79	2.68	1.89
Steel Industry	-1.8	6.91	5.11
Metal Goods	-1.14	4.99	3.85

¹² Source: Cheong (2000).

Table 7 (Continued)			
Automobiles	0.68	6.63	7.31
Other Transport Equipment	-1.31	14.67	13.36
Electric & Electronic Industry	-0.65	6.9	6.25
Other Equipment	-1.65	8.23	6.58
Other Manufacturing	-1.86	-3.98	-5.84

Note: Estimates are changes of quantity.

It is known that the Korean general public concerns reflect the mistrust of Japan as well as its led-strong resistances to market opening, especially among some Korean business sectors. Japan is also not free of similar domestic resistances from the vested interest group, especially in the agriculture, fishery, and apparel businesses sectors. Yet, some scholars, such as Ippei Yamazawa (2001) insist that the prediction does not fit the current situation in which intra-industry specialization in each industry between Korea and Japan. Rather, it is more likely that both Korean and Japanese firms will survive the intensified competition and furthermore, paradoxically they will become globally competitive having each intra-industry specialization. Therefore, a closer Japan-Korea relations will be needed for both to survive globalization and both countries should more focus on intra-industry specialization when discussing the best framework for the KJFTA. In overall, surprisingly there are not many studies insisting on the expected huge economic losses or negative effects resulting from the bilateral FTA. The reasons can be assumed as following reasons: first, a FTA analysis is usually produced by

research institutions which are the government-side or government-affiliated. Secondly, many business sectors would indeed benefit from the achievement of FTAs, by contrast, relatively few sectors would harm by it. Still, the existing analyses prove that the bilateral FTA between Korea and Japan would bring positive gains to both economies in the short-term and much broader in the long-term.

CHAPTER III. THE STRUCTURAL PATTERNS OF JAPAN'S TRADE POLITICS

3.1. Japan's FTA Policymaking Process: Continuity of "*Iron Triangle*"

Domestic politics has been a primary concern in pursuing trade agreements in the Japanese society for long decades, particularly close on FTA policymaking process. Japan's willingness to negotiate FTAs was usually not matched by a readiness to liberalize specific trade sectors like agriculture. Most notably, Japan has used a variety of mechanisms to limit the extent of agricultural concessions in FTAs (Mulgan, 2008). Various existing analyses of Japan's policymaking on foreign economic policies explain the Japanese model represented as "iron triangle," "one-party dominance," "bureaucratic dominance," or "patterned pluralism". Japan's FTA politics according to Mulgan's analysis, also can be summarized as domestic trade policymaking on the demand side as well as some aspects of the supply side. On the demand side, for example, interest groups in the agricultural sector mobilize more strongly demand to agricultural protection, while on the supply side, the high-level of trade agreements for broader national interest are welcomed by national leaders and beneficiaries, especially among conservatives and profitable businesses (Mulgan, 2008).

The extensive analysis by Aurelia Mulgan's dedications reveals that Japan's trade policy subgovernments consist of bureaucrats from METI, LDP

politicians with close ties to industry and the executives of peak business organizations such as Keidanren. They seek to promote the interests of Japanese industry, not only in the domestic market but also in the world market through trade liberalization. The bureaucrats within the policy subgovernments significantly exercises their policymaking authority and also acts as a producer-side role (Mulgan, 2005). This demand and supply side of Japanese trade policymaking also can be explained by the power-elite model arguing that Japan's national policy is still managed by the triad alliance of the LDP politicians, the bureaucrats under key ministries, and big business organizations with their participation in policymaking process (Cheng, 1990). Borrowing these ideas, I would like to break the trade policy subgovernments down into the following three actors, each a prolonged ruling LDP, the bureaucracy of METI and MAFF, and interest groups such as Keidanren (business) and Nokyo (agriculture), to see how they have managed the "iron-triangle" mechanism affecting to Japan's trade policymaking.

3.1.1. Political Party: Pork-Barrel Politics & Clientelism

Since the postwar 1955 system has settled down in Japan, LDP has enjoyed its conservative rules for many decades, particularly with the reform of the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and multiple constituency seats. Gerald Curtis specifically clarifies that the new electoral system made LDP politicians promote intra-party competition, encouraging them to organize factions in order to maximize their personal vote (Curtis, 1988). This feature made the LDP enjoy a more stable and uncompetitive political market outside the party, thus LDP has overwhelmingly managed the overall Japan's trade politics in the postwar Japan. Within the policy subgovernments, on the one hand, decisions are made by adjusting the opinions and interests of the key political, bureaucratic and interest group actors through a process of consensus building. In Japan, a key stage in this process is needed for prior scrutiny and approval by the relevant committee of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council (hereafter "PARC") and the party's Executive Council before a policy or bill is passed on to the Cabinet for its ratification. In other words, if the party does not give a prior approval through those internal organs, the Cabinet cannot push ahead their bills or policies. In this way, the PARC committees within the LDP became the primary locus of policymaking by special interest politicians. As a result, the LDP as a long-term ruling party has contributed to the growing influence of those party politicians in

policymaking (Yamashita, 2005). In addition, the specific issue-related politicians were able to influence significant power to decision-making process. For example, it was happened that METI bureaucrats and pro-industry politicians have no choice, but to comply with the objectives of agriculture-related legislators concerning specific FTA negotiations (Yamashita, 2005).

Then, where the power of Japan's conservative politicians comes from? The principal-agent model explained by Daniel Okimoto identifies that the relationships between politicians and voters is reflected in an organizational hierarchy or information asymmetry in political activities: specifically, members of Congress as agents buy re-elections from their principals of constituents, on the other hand, constituents delegate their profit-making pork to members of Congress as a deposit, so that Diet members are able to get their own benefits of re-elections through voters' selections (Okimoto, 1989). Based on the feature of principal-agent relations, the LDP politicians have had a grand coalition within the subgovernments. First, the LDP receives clientelistic votes from their supporters in exchange for favorable legislations, subsidies, favored tax treatments, and other promotional policies from the ministries such as MAFF and METI. Then, the LDP was possible to get a reciprocal patronage from involved interest groups that include a variety of traditional LDP supporters having each different regional interests (Okimoto, 1989). In here, an agricultural-interested

group of Japan is deeply involved with the clientalistic relations with regional LDP politicians, and creating opposition forces together in the issue of agricultural liberalization. This was possible because the LDP has had its strongest base of support particularly in many rural and semi-urban districts, as proved in the latter part of paper.

The dynamic “crisis and compensation” politics of LDP in order to be a central party has been understood as a “carrot and the stick” strategy or “distributive” politics to achieve its political and policy related objectives throughout the postwar period. The pattern of compensation politics explicitly helped to keep the ruling conservatives in power as the principle of pork barrel politics. The LDP maintained its conservative superiority through material distributive politics, particularly for the agriculture, defense, regional development, small business and welfare sector. This feature is also founded during the period of KJFTA negotiations in the LDP’s ruling terms. Since 2003 when the KJFTA negotiations have initiated, LDP has seized the government in most of terms as **Table 8** demonstrates. Thus, the mobilization of voters in support of specific interest group objectives was relatively easy in terms of compensating politics throughout the past conservative years. The question is that the compensation politics which is consolidating the LDP’s dominance might negatively affect to controversial issues for each industry in the KJFTA negotiations.

Table 8. Japanese General Election Since 2003				
	2003	2005	2009	2012
Leader	Junichiro Koizumi	Junichiro Koizumi	Yukio Hatoyama	Shinzo Abe
Party	Liberal Democratic	Liberal Democratic	Democratic	Liberal Democratic
Seats won	237	296	308	294
Popular vote	43.85%	47.77%	47.43%	43.01%

In those consequent conservative years, the LDP legislators could target their pork-barrel items such as highways, bridges, or profitable contracts to their supporters. For this, they extracted financial contributions from the business community, which they could then redistribute to other supporters (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993). With the prolonged dominance of LDP, the growth of party *zoku* [tribe] politicians in the Diet has been notably crucial in creating a consensus within the subgovernments of aggregate interest. The *zoku* Diet members has become increasingly bureaucratized and specialized while forming aggregate interests involving with a particular ministry and the PARC, and also they determine how the side payments are distributed among competing interest groups (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987). As a result, the increasing policy experts of politicians through their participation in *zoku* and the strong links established with interest groups have relatively strengthened the roles as well as the influences of

politicians in policymaking process (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987). In each case, the conservatives had to respond with policies that redistributed wealth to the interest groups to whom the opposition was trying to appeal. In this regard, in the crisis periods of the LDP, there might have not enough capabilities to focus on the issue of trade negotiations especially for FTAs struggling many conflicts within the domestic society. Rather, the Diet members concentrated on making a wealthy nation to overcome several economic crises for last decades, while distributing compensations as pork barrel spending to all over Japanese regional society.

In short, the traditional view of Japan's policymaking was seen as the bureaucracy-dominant model, however the postwar politics well reflects the reality that the growing influence of politicians has been more significant actor in drawing a consensus among power elites in the policymaking (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987). Muramatsu and Krauss's findings (**Table 9**) show that LDP politicians are exceptionally influential than any other actors including bureaucrats in decision-making process of postwar politics.

Table 9. Group Most Influential in Policy Process				
	Higher Bureaucrats(%)	Middle Bureaucrats(%)	LDP Politicians(%)	Opposition Politicians(%)
Party politicians	47	45	68	43
Bureaucrats	46	40	30	41
Judges	*	*	*	*
Businessmen	*	5	*	14
Labor	*	*	*	*
Agriculture	*	3	*	*
Intellectuals, Religious groups & citizens' groups	*	1	*	*
Mass media	4	4	2	*
Others and NA	4	3	*	3
Total	101	101	100	101
N	55	195	50	51
Note: *None or less than 1%.				
Source: Muramatsu and Krauss (1987)				

Being the sole party with a broad base of national support therefore places the LDP in a very advantageous position in decision-making such policies. The LDP as a long-term ruling party has also contributed to the increasing influence of politicians in Japan's policymaking process. However, because of LDP's broad base of electoral support as a catch-all-party, this fact inversely could make it harder to have a domestic consensus of trade liberalization especially in non-competitive industries. Indeed, the most salient conflicts emerged from trade subgovernments, representing the triad alliance relationships among LDP politicians, specific ministries, and interest groups who share vested interests.

3.1.2. Bureaucrats: Vertical Segmentation

The policymaking process in Japan has been characterized by the weakness of the political executive (the Prime Minister and his/her cabinet) and the important role of extra-parliamentary processes in decision-making (Solis, 2010). The traditional cabinet government of Japan characterized as “bureaucratic sectionalism” or “vertical segmentation” represents its weakness of consensus building capability, largely originated from the bureaucratic rivalry and the strong influence of the cabinet, that is, a lack of executive leadership. As the number of bureaucracies involved in a particular issue increases, the outcome of policies is tightly managed by bureaucracy rivalry with their diverging preferences. Diffused coordination of co-equal bureaucracies, therefore, hold veto power to place restrictions on the speed and scope of policymaking process.

Japan’s bureaucratic sectionalism has imposed an added burden on the policymaking capabilities of the Japanese political society. All ministries having a stake in trade negotiations claim to be directly involved in the negotiation process, approximately 80 officials are tied up in each individual FTA negotiation. Those associated human resources are overloaded, having different interests in trade negotiation tables (Pekkanen, Solis and Katada, 2007). Therefore, this bureaucratic sectionalism is so intense because bureaucratic policymaking requires a long-drawn-out process of accommodation among co-equal

bureaucracies. The dynamism has been a huge burden in Japan's FTA negotiation style especially where an agreement among several ministries with very diverse positions on FTA is required. METI has been at the forefront of active FTA initiative in order to look after the playing field of Japanese companies abroad and to promote structural reforms by gradually exposing non-competitive sectors to world market simultaneously (Solis, 2010). The FTA policy has become an important priority for the bureaucracies in order to deal with multiple FTA initiatives. As each bureaucracy under ministries strengthened its FTA negotiation capabilities, consequently the problem of inter-bureaucratic competition became more acute and it is hard to be reconciled (Solis, 2010).

Moreover, the coordination role of the cabinet is weak because cabinet ministers tend to represent the interests of all their ministries. The lack of strong top-down authority as well as the absence of bureaucratic coordination capabilities by the highest-level of cabinet signifies that sometimes specific interests tend to predominate over national interests in policy decisions (Mulgan, 2008). Since Japan has no single organ generating trade policy, there is nobody capable of accommodating conflicting domestic claims on trade issues. As a result, FTAs generally make a slow progress in Japan owing to the clash of interests between agriculture and industry. In short, these segmented characteristics are able to apply the case of KJFTA discussions, which are struggling difficulties in combining

different interests within the diffused coordination of bureaucracy, especially in Japan's non-competitive sectors such as agriculture. Nonetheless, bureaucratic politics fundamentally remains at the center of postwar Japanese policymaking process. The Cabinet conducts trade policy according to the directions of their constituencies, and by doing so, Japanese bureaucrats under the control of ministries develop the close relations with interest groups. From the experiences of FTA with several economies, the exclusion of agricultural trade in most cases represents that Japanese farmers and their representing interests through MAFF is still fierce enough to block METI's initiative for agricultural liberalization through FTAs.

The balance of power in executive-legislative branch is in flux with recent movements to reinforce the executive authority. Former Prime Minister Koizumi put his effort on strengthening executive authority with his enormous political popularity. Koizumi promised to voters to destroy the old LDP system and he exercised an excessive amount of leadership in its plan (Solis, 2010). On the FTA front, Koizumi attempted to shake up the traditional policymaking process by creating a FTA subcommittee in the PARC in 2002 to be headed by commerce industrial zoku politicians (Mulgan, 2005). In the periods of the Cabinet under PM Abe and PM Fukuda had tried to interject more directly into the FTA policymaking through the Council of Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) in the Cabinet which

created a working group on EPAs and carried the agricultural structural reform and a strategic FTA policy (Solis, 2010). Koizumi's successor, Abe, strikingly attempted to resolve the vertical segmentation of bureaucracy by creating a trade representative office which merged the FTA headquarters of MOFA, MITI and MAFF. It is definite that bureaucratic sectionalism is going to work negatively for Japan's ambitious FTA policy and its goals for agricultural market liberalization and structural reforms.

As Naoko Munakata explains, the most serious challenge of Japan might be a lack of political leadership, especially in foreign trade policymaking. The main cause lies in the fact that Japan's policy toward economic integration has evolved basically by reacting to given outside circumstances (Munakata, 2001). While Japan has steadily contributed to the creation of multilateral institutions, for example, by participating in the APEC and by establishing the AIIB, it has failed to follow through the efforts in implementing politically controversial reforms and providing a momentum for regional initiatives in East Asia. Apparently, the centralized trade policymaking is more effective to policy change or diffusion since the executive branch can react to a broader electoral constituency. If there are fewer veto players in policymaking process, trade policy is not likely to be handled by the iron-triangle of pork barrel politicians, segmented bureaucracy and clientalized interest groups (Mulgan, 2005).

3.1.3. Interest Groups: Principal-Agent Model

The dynamics of LDP interactions with Japanese bureaucrats and interest groups politically has established a segmented policymaking process (Okimoto, 1989). Among this, Japanese pressure groups, such as the agriculture cooperatives and small business federations, are huge and aggressive enough influences to political parties as well as the bureaucracy of Japan. In agriculture, for example, there is a massive Japan's agricultural cooperatives, the so-called "*Nokyo* (JA)", having approximately 10 million individual memberships and almost 10 thousand corporations and groups membership as of 2014 as its constituency. In the business sector, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (*Nissho*, JCCI) is closely allied with many LDP politicians; similarly, the Japan Council for Economic Development (*Keizai Doyukai*, JCED) also has its strong cross-party political ties. The two other conservative forces of the business federations, *Keidanren* and *Nikkeiren*, also have often been immobilized in the policy formation process by their large-size and complex internal decision-making processes (Calder, 1988). However, *Keidanren* and *Nikkeiren* also frequently exercise their influence on Japan's trade policymaking, opposing the policies which are non-beneficial to them. Most interest groups of Japan keep closely connected with LDP politicians and bureaucrats of major ministries, so that they can raise their voices as essential subgovernments in policymaking process. Virtually, a majority of interest groups

in Japan is greatly influenced by the authority of government bureaucracy (Okimoto, 1989).

On the FTA issue, the concentrated benefits of FTAs to special business interests motivate the Japanese business community to press for signing FTAs with particular countries and also demand a certain-level of agricultural protection by agriculture-related interest groups. These conflicting views cause the main obstacle to reach the successful conclusion of trade agreements (Cheng, 1990). To be specific, the industrial policy subgovernments consisting of bureaucrats from METI, LDP politicians are close ties to Japanese industry and the executives of peak business organizations like Keidanren. They seek to promote the interests of Japanese industry, not only in the domestic market but also in overseas market (Mulgan, 2005). In comparison with Nokyo's agricultural lobbying, Keidanren as a representative organ of business sector, early on appeared as a key advocator for FTAs. Since the late 1990s, Japanese businesses community has started to insist the launch of FTAs for its defensive strategy to respond a global trend of trade liberalization. According to Yoshimatsu's analysis, Keidanren has played a key role in disseminating information on the benefits of FTAs through policy participation and also has put its efforts into press its views on the merits of FTAs not only on industrial bureaucrats, but also on MAFF officials by contacting the agricultural policy group. Consequently, Keidanren has donated its political

contributions in trade policymaking, seeking a more direct way for financial contributions to political parties in exchange of favored economic policies.

However, these Keidanren's lobbying activities turned relatively quiet in the case of KJFTA negotiations process. It never formed an FTA committee but only a more modest industrial cooperation forum to oversee FTA talks (Yoshimatsu, 2005); nor did it launch a sustained campaign to rescue the FTA talks after its suspension since 2004 (Katada and Solis, 2009). It signifies the reality that Japanese industries lost their incentives to lobby and also they were not ready to confront the powerful objection by the agricultural lobby, since the most harmful discriminatory trade measure against Japanese firms had been eliminated. On the other hand, the political representatives of Nokyo have traditionally aligned with the LDP politicians, acting as a pressure group in the decision-making process. Major interest groups involved with both the business sector and the agricultural sector have been strongly affiliated with LDP politicians who have a power to reflect their interests in the trade policies.

Particularly, for small-scale farmers as principals who are members of the agricultural cooperative, it is the only route to deliver their messages and represent their interests to the political parties. LDP and the bureaucrats of ministries concerned as agents cannot disregard small-scale farmers' opinions since the farmers provide significant amounts of votes and financial aids, as a powerful

pressure group. To put it a different way, by referring to principal-agent model, the farmers' representative, Nokyo is also can be regarded as rational agents who convey pork to LDP politicians; LDP agricultural zoku *giin* are manipulated by agents of Nokyo to serve the farmers' aggregate interests in the Diet (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993). In other words, farmers as members of Nokyo buy patrons of legislators through elections, who can materialize farmers-favored policies. With the strong and diverse Nokyo's lobbying activities in FTA policymaking, Keidanren has not strongly committed to promote trade liberalization any more in KJFTA negotiations due to its lack of trade diversion effect to Japan. All these factors have crucially affected the fate of KJFTA discussions up to now.

In summary, the international determinants cannot solely explain the key of understanding Japan's FTA selections, it is significantly important to consider domestic factors centering on iron-triangle alignment of Japanese politics and understand how it affects to policymaking process of each FTA. As Solis classifies two variables of domestic determinants, lobbying incentives for interest groups and centralized trade policymaking by the Cabinet are central to understand the negotiations of Japan's FTA preferences. Besides, Japan's policymaking process has been dominantly influenced by two large pressure groups, Keidanren and Nokyo (Solis, 2010). Both business and agriculture sector relying on those peak associations to explicit their positions and to lobby bureaucrats of related

ministries and politicians (Katada and Solis, 2010). In the next chapter, I would like to closely oversee the activities of Japanese farmers as organized power in affecting agricultural policymaking and examine how they are affiliated with zoku Diet members within LDP, MAFF bureaucrats, and agriculture cooperatives on the whole.

3.2. “*Segmented Corporatism*” under Japan’s Trade Politics

The Development of Pluralist Corporatism

The iron-triangle alliance and the notion called “corporatism” are taken together in understanding the characteristics of postwar Japan’s policymaking mechanism. The corporatism well characterizes Japan’s political economy policymaking process. Japanese bureaucrats play a political role in packaging bargains between interest groups. This fact contributes to the slowness of policymaking process since the bureaucrats elaborate compromises and give themselves the discretion to insert their own agenda into policy outcomes. In practice, the ministries such as METI or MAFF and LDP politicians negotiate closely with each other, even though one cannot easily which really dominates the policymaking process (Vogel, 2006). The essence of corporatist model is a two-way of relationship between government and interest groups meaning that a formal inclusion of groups in the bureaucracy for a purpose of policy implementation is in exchange for a legitimate role in policymaking as well as an institutionalized system of rewards (Cheng, 1990). Thus, the practice of dual-office holding reveals that politicians who occupy leadership positions in interest groups concurrently with the Diet office, provide a direct political connection to the central government. The Japanese farm lobbyist, for instance, is well represented in the members of the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives by occupying the

executives of agriculture-related subcommittees. At the same time, the Policy Research Institute of the MAFF (PRIMAFF) also brings together the Diet politicians with connections to the agricultural cooperatives (Cheng, 1990).

The notion of corporatism is also clearly applicable to the activities of interest groups in the agricultural sector. It represents a versions of modified elitism (in other words, pluralist corporatism) with the power linkages between the ruling party, the bureaucracy and interest groups in the agricultural sector, allowing a continuous and direct access to government decision-making and corresponding authority over government policy. In Mulgan's words, Japan's agricultural interest group system well embodies the characters of corporatism, more precisely a hybrid of pluralist corporatism. Taken as a whole, farmers' interest group constitute a large interest representational linkage, categorized by cross-cutting organizational network and interconnecting membership (Mulgan, 2013). More specifically, the political characteristics of corporatism results in close mutual penetration of MAFF bureaucracy and large interest groups. The more institutionalized interest groups like agricultural organizations tend to more cooperate with the bureaucracy, while the less ones prefer a political party to promote newer policies (**Table 10**).

Table 10. Sources of Government Support by Type of Interest Group¹³				
Interest group	Party	Bureaucracy	Other responses and not applicable	N
Agriculture	17.6%	78.3%	4.3%	23
Welfare	53.3	46.7	-	30
Economic	37.5	56.8	5.6	88
Labor	69.2	25.0	5.7	52
Administrative	46.7	46.7	6.7	15
Educational	33.3	66.7	-	12
Professional	55.6	33.3	11.1	9
Citizen/Political	47.4	36.8	15.9	19
Others	75.0	-	25.0	4
ALL	46.4%	47.6%	6.0%	252

Besides, Nokyo's activities serve both private interests as organizational and membership interests and public policy goals as the government's interests (Mulgan, 2013). In turn, Nokyo receives various kinds of administrative and financial support from the government. It also enjoys privileged access to government as a legitimate participant in trade negotiations on agricultural policy. Therefore, the parallel administrative structure of between government and Nokyo facilitate not only Nokyo's supervision by MAFF bureaucrats but also its role in implementing agricultural policy and its subsidization by government. Corporatized alliance ultimately allows Nokyo to have influence and leverage to

¹³ Source: Muramatsu and Krauss (1987).

ensure regulative authority as its role of administrative agent in Japanese agricultural policymaking. As the enhanced role of interest groups in the ruling coordination, the tendency of its interactions with bureaucracy has been strengthened. Furthermore, interest groups successfully utilized their contacts with LDP politicians and bureaucrats to develop preferable policymaking. The research result (**Table 11**) clearly exhibits between 65 and 91 percent of each interest group including agriculture sector succeeded to reflect its demand on government policies.

Table 11. Lobbying Success by Type of Interest Group (%)¹⁴		
Interest group (N=248)	Had favorable policy adopted	Had objection-able policy stopped or revised
Agricultural	82.60%	39.10%
Business and financial	64.80%	43.20%
ALL	70.60%	50.80%

In this way, the triple alliance relationships of the LDP politicians, bureaucracy and interest groups have established the corporatized subgovernments in Japan's policymaking process. In other words, Muramatsu and Krauss's expression of "patterned pluralism" has been developed as political tactic of the LDP in postwar Japan (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987). During the period, LDP

¹⁴ Source: Muramatsu and Krauss (1987) modified by author.

conservatives and bureaucracy strategically allied mostly because of the fact that they had enough resources and expertise to legitimize themselves as governing power. Besides, interest groups began to act as a major role in reflecting their interests in conservative politics. As I illustrated so far, agriculture industry through Nokyo, as the most popular example, became a part of ruling coalition with LDP giving its rural vote to agriculture-related Diet members. Above the coalition, LDP prime minister as a head of governing party and bureaucracy dominates the government wide coordination. These all consists solid subgovernments generating a mutual interdependence in economic policymaking (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987). Ultimately, these resulted in the ruling political coalition, “pluralist corporatism,” among LDP, interest groups, and ministry ties. The institutionalized relationships share a common interest and form the powerful subgovernments to influence policies.

The Development of Segmented Corporatism

In addition to the pluralist feature of corporatized alignments, Japan’s FTA policymaking also exhibits some indication of segmented corporatism. First, a “bottom-up” policymaking pattern, whereby strong policy subgovernments and weak bureaucratic coordination. It gives clout to interest groups and generates a cumbersome negotiation process with the conflicting interests of internationalized

business sectors and domestic-oriented agricultural society to be reconciled (Solis, 2008). This domestic political constraint, thus, has repeatedly delayed Japan's FTA with larger trading partners. According to Mireya Solis's argument, one of the most important changes occurred in Japan is the growing politicization of trade policy with the more active intervention of politicians attuned to public opinion trends. In addition, domestic politics of Japanese trade policy are in fluctuations with attempts to centralize policymaking and growing divisions among members of the peak associations for agriculture and business, Nokyo and Keidanren respectively (Solis, 2008). Therefore, it is remarkable that political competition by major interest groups greatly influences to Japan's FTA policy and the trade negotiation process.

In the same context, Saori Katada and Mireya Solis's claim is notable stating as Japan's foreign policy is better explained with an idea at the domestic lobbying activities of affected interest groups. The conventional view of international political economy explaining that greater economic interdependence produces an incentive for active foreign policy engagement, does not match with the Japanese case. One reason for the fact is about the feature of "*immobilism*" explained by the authors which gives significant implications to the case of KJFTA negotiations. That is, the characteristics of "immobilism" in the negotiations with Korea has resulted from the clash of interest groups in Japan and the industry's

lobbying activities to obtain the economic benefits (Katada and Solis, 2010). Muramatsu and Krauss also investigated that policy immobilism is one possible outcome of segmented pattern of Japan's policymaking (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987).

With these backgrounds, the balance of power between the executive and the legislative branches over trade negotiations authority as well as inter-ministerial coordination capability is unquestionably significant to determine Japan's FTA policies (Solis, 2010). However, the coordination role of the Cabinet in Japan is assumed as comparatively weak, because cabinet ministers tend to represent the interests of each ministry within the policy subgovernments respectively. It is evident that the lack of FTA initiative by Japanese bureaucrats is a stark contrast to the political leadership in the Korean case. In Japan, since the Japan-Singapore EPA was concluded, the team of four Ministries (MOF, MOFA, METI, and MAFF) together has formed to arrange the negotiations of each FTA. Time to time, the coordination among the four ministries in discussing FTA policies began to show a crack, since no one stood above the four ministries in order to make a definite decision when interests of four ministries conflict each other. So far, major four ministries have played an important role in defining the characteristics and contents of each FTA and the point is that one ministry's objection has become a crucial veto to the whole process of trade negotiations like

in the case of Japan-ASEAN FTA¹⁵ (Ito, 2005).

Like this, the bureaucratic sectionalism is still fierce in Japan and it has led a prolonged negotiation process to accommodate all bureaucrats' interests in Japan's trade policy. It is necessary for Japan's bureaucratic system to have a powerful or responsible role which is able to accommodate and influence four ministries' diverse interests in negotiations (Solis, 2010). In this regard, METI has been taking a pivotal role in pushing forward FTAs, newly advancing its initiative to more proactive FTA policy. More recently, MAFF has also tried to alleviate agricultural opposition by advocating Japanese agricultural exports through several FTAs and TPP participation. According to Muramatsu and Krauss's argument (1987), more solutions are to be considered in order to break the segmented corporatized policymaking: first, the strengthening coordination role of the prime minister and his cabinet staffs; secondly, as recent Abe's plans on administrative reforms¹⁶ suggested, the enlarged management capability and the development of more specialized conflict management roles within the LDP such as through PARC. The powerful authority of prime minister would be able to play a bridge role between a conflict of domestic interests as well as between a conflict of international and domestic interests in trade policymaking process.

¹⁵ 朝日新聞「聖域残しEPA前進 ASEANと大筋合意」(2007/05/05)

¹⁶ Refer to “首相官邸傘下行政改革推進本部” website <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/gyoukakusuisin/>.

CHAPTER IV. DEFENDING ORGANIZED FARMERS IN JAPAN'S AGRICULTURAL POLICYMAKING

4.1. Most Conflicting Issue in Non-competitive Sectors: Agriculture and Trade Liberalization

Non-Concessional Agricultural Sector

This section will demonstrate a more detailed explanation concerning a core issue of agricultural sector in Japan's trade politics. As illustrated in the introduction part, in terms of trade effects, generally Korea and Japan have comparative advantages of each different industry. Japan enjoys a strong comparative advantage in automobiles, electronics, and general machinery, but their agricultural and textile industries show its relative weaknesses. Korea, on the other hand, has a comparative advantage in electronics, textiles, and steel, but its advantage is quite low in the agricultural sector as well. While Japan has shown more resistance against a trade liberalization of agriculture sector, Korea has often raised complaints about liberalization of its automobile and electronics industries the most. This implies that a free trade of the agricultural commodities is a highly sensitive issue for both Korean and Japanese interest groups.

In the case of KJFTA, from the first round of negotiations, Japanese officials have strongly expressed their wishes to exclude agricultural products from the agreement in consideration of its industrial uniqueness (Ahn, 2005).

Since the agriculture and fishery sectors have heavy political and economic significance in Japanese society, thereby the Japanese government has excluded the agricultural commodities from the trade agreements ever since Japan started to have a talk of bilateral trade negotiations with Singapore (JSEPA). Based on this fact, Korea's agricultural exports to Japan are higher than its imports from Japan and this indicates that Korean agricultural products are generally more competitive in terms of price than Japan. This is one of the biggest reasons why Japanese farmers has kept opposing the free trade with Korea due to the fear of losing their domestic market, as its general price-level is lower in Korea than in Japan. Even though only about 1.6 percent of the population is engaged in agricultural business (2 million people of 125 million entire population as of 2015¹⁷), and their contribution to the whole Japanese GDP in agricultural sector is merely about 1 percent in 2014 (latest information)¹⁸, the LDP-led government has continued to provide extensive protection and assistance to the agricultural sector sacrificing the interests of non-agricultural sectors, particularly on the manufacturing industry. These privileges that Japanese agricultural sector has been enjoyed for a long time also generate further difficulties to proceed the negotiations. In short, the

¹⁷ Statistics of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (2015) 「2015年度農林業センサス結果」【農業就業人口】.

¹⁸ Statistics of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (2014) 「平成25年度農業・食料関連産業の経済計算」.

agricultural sector still remains as the most demanding part to negotiate between Korea and Japan in FTA talks.

Above all, “rice” representing Japan’s agriculture is an extremely important in terms of political interests. For this reason, among the major trading countries, Japan has exceptionally occupied a protectionist position in the world market for rice as well as other agricultural products (Mulgan, 2013). Japan’s average applied tariff is one of the highest one compared with other developed countries (For rice, free(in-quota), *341yen/kg(out-of-quota¹⁹) (Song, 2005). The general tariff rates for import goods according to Nakajima’s analysis, are set at a high-level in the agricultural and food processing sectors, with the highest rates in the rice sector at 80.35 percent in 2003 for all East Asian region. Consequently, the elimination of tariffs under an FTA will result in a drastic decrease in the price of Japanese agricultural products. For this reason, Japanese farmers are highly interested in lobbying politicians in order to maintain agricultural protection (Mulgan, 2008). For its strategy, the LDP-led government has set extremely high tariff rates for such agricultural products as rice, dairy products, sugar and wheat. Thus, LDP had been extremely reluctant to agree FTAs with major agricultural exporters like the United States, Australia, and Canada who have a huge market with a relative price advantage to protect farmers (Sasada, 2013).

¹⁹ Source: 日本関税協会「実行関税率表」.

On top of that, its political importance is almost as high as it is in Korea because of Japan's long history of protecting its agricultural sector and a tradition that Japanese farmers show their resistance against liberalization. Japanese politicians, especially being as regional conservative forces, has generally supported agricultural protection since they seek to retain power in the Cabinet in exchange for materialistic benefits such as votes, monetary donations, and campaign support from regional farmers and their supporting groups. Like this, the Japanese agricultural lobbying has continued to be a formidable force to the central government for several decades. In here, the agricultural zoku on behalf of that regional forces of agriculture sector in Japan still dominates intra-party policymaking and the agricultural bureaucracy working hard to the main system of protection and subsidization (Pekkanen, Solis and Katada, 2007). Until now, for these reasons, there has not been built enough consensus on the necessity of trade liberalization on the agricultural sector. In other words, for Japanese farmers, cabinet officials, politicians and even consumers, they have little incentives to approve the liberalization of agricultural sector.

Agricultural Politics under Iron-Triangle

Japan's trade policymaking process in the agricultural area as examined so far, has been significantly dominated by the so-called "iron triangle"

relationships which consist of farmers represented by agriculture cooperatives, LDP as ruling party, and MAFF bureaucracy (Honma, 2010; Yamashita, 2009; Sasada, 2013). In a nutshell, farm politicians in the LDP, MAFF bureaucrats and key interest groups such as agricultural cooperatives, who share a strong common interest in promoting and protecting domestic agriculture sector, form the agricultural policy subgovernments, representing a primary role in making preferable agricultural trade policy for their interest (Mulgan, 2008). Amongst the iron-triangle actors, MAFF with a role of overseeing agricultural sector has been strongly resistant toward agricultural liberalization at the FTA negotiation table. However, MAFF has changed its position on several FTA negotiations depending on the situation it faces. Recently, MAFF tries to soften agricultural opposition by advocating Japanese agricultural exports through FTAs (Solis, 2010). Particularly since it encountered a drastic movement of agricultural reforms, it has attempted to upgrade its competitiveness of Japan's agricultural households²⁰.

Essentially, most Japanese farmers who engaged in rice production have voted primarily for LDP politicians, allowing LDP to remain in power for last several decades (Horiuchi and Saito, 2010; Sasada, 2013). In this sense, farmers

²⁰ Refer to 朝日新聞「農協圧力、監視を強化 公取委、TPP発行前に」(2016/05/31) & 朝日新聞「農協改革、官民で推進 金融機関が参入 新次官に「改革派」」(2016/06/16)

are particularly important to LDP as over-representing rural votes in the Diet²¹ and this malapportionment allows the rural-based LDP to stay in power for an extended period of time (Krauss, 1995). This, in turn, resulted in the completion of the government's protectionist trade policies in the period. And then, those LDP politicians who received support from rural votes, accordingly, lobbied the government to adopt favorable policies to agricultural industry, such as trade protections for agricultural products. Particularly, the agricultural zoku Diet members represent the specific interests of farmers in the Diet in collaboration with agricultural cooperatives and the PARC (Mulgan, 2008; Yoshimatsu, 2006; Sasada, 2013). Within the LDP's policymaking headquarter, PARC and the Agricultural and Forestry Division and the Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee (*Norin-Bukai & Norinsuisan Senryaku-Chousakai*²²) are the most essential agriculture-related committees. These have at least half of the LDP's Diet members (150 to 200 members respectively) involving party activities concerned with agricultural issues (George, 1981). Decisions reached by those party agricultural committees are eventually transferred to the PARC and then to

²¹ See Appendix I [2000年代自民党の衆議院議員選挙結果(小選挙区・比例代表選挙区)] & Appendix II [2000年代自民党の参議院議員選挙結果(選挙区・比例代表選挙区)]. This shows the overall LDP's traditional regional bases in Japan through both elections for House of Representatives and House of Councilors in the 2000s. As seen in the major past elections in postwar period, LDP politicians are influential in the agricultural regions which belong to traditional LDP's constituencies.

²² See Appendix V [自民党内の「農林部会」と「農林水産戦略調査会」].

the LDP.

The MAFF bureaucrats, on the other hand, assisted LDP politicians in drafting bills to protect farmers and agricultural sector, and besides they arranged in a variety of regulatory measures to intervene in Japan's agricultural market before trade liberalization (Mulgan, 2008). In the meantime, the agricultural cooperatives play an intermediary role connecting LDP agricultural zoku Diet members to agricultural constituents by mobilizing support in favor of selected candidates. Nokyo, who has a hierarchical and nation-wide network in the Japanese agricultural society, acts a pivotal role in the political structure and economy of its agricultural sector. It has strong ties with the LDP regional politicians for the entire postwar period. With its presence of LDP agricultural zoku politicians in the Diet, Nokyo has been able to ensure that farmers' interests are securely protected. Despite the discussions of Nokyo's structural reforms, today Nokyo's financial power and its political existence are also being a solid base of agricultural regions. All these clearly indicate that the iron-triangle alliance still largely dominates Japan's agricultural policymaking.

Continuity under the DPJ Government

Many expected that under the DPJ government, Japan's trade policy would be able to get a momentum for those deadlocked bilateral trade negotiations,

since because the DPJ tradition has been consistently advocating trade liberalization policies and promoting market competition since its foundation in 1998. The main pillars of DPJ trade policies under the Noda Cabinet are the promotion of trade liberalization through FTAs and introduction of an income supporting system for farming households²³ (Sasada, 2013). Despite the 2009 election victory, the DPJ failed to put their proposed policies into practice in the promotion of trade liberalization. Under the Hatoyama and Kan administrations between 2009 and 2011 did not initiate any new FTA negotiations, but finally, Prime Minister Noda in 2011 announced the Japan's participation in the TPP negotiations which is promoting a high-level of trade liberalization among members. According to the DPJ's representative, Ozawa Ichiro's calling for a comprehensive policy aiming to revive rural communities, DPJ tried to reallocate the existing subsidies from construction projects to support for farmers (Sasada, 2008). Because DPJ strongly advocated trade liberalization including the agricultural market, therefore the party used the subsidies as compensation for domestic farmers (Sasada, 2008).

The DPJ is often considered as an “urban party” as its own a high percentage of urban constituencies, and the party's policies reflect the preferences of urban voters. The background of the DPJ's early support for trade liberalization

²³ 朝日新聞「野田首相の施政方針演説 <全文>」(2012/01/25).

policies, accordingly, was stemming from the urban popularity, particularly represented in the majority of urban prefectures in the Lower House elections. Besides, the results of the DPJ victories in the 2007 and 2009 elections turned out a sudden increase in the number of DPJ candidates who are elected from rural districts (**Figure 1**) (Sasada, 2013). Its expanded constituencies made the DPJ pays more attention to the interests of the rural areas which was originally the LDP's constituency. In this regard, the DPJ has transformed from an urban party to "catch-all-party" during the period. That means, even under the DPJ government, it was not a good time to initiate strong drives for pushing such FTAs that might be conflicting interests to rural constituents.

With another aspect of the conservative continuity between LDP and DPJ's stance on trade policies, it is grounded on Japan's conservative political shift in overall political society of 2000s. Park Cheol Hee's analysis (2015) clarifies that the conservative forces regardless of party affiliation are gradually reinforcing their power, as the significance of the progressive or liberals are declining within major parties in the period. Only with the conservative shift managed by Hatoyama, Kan and Ozawa, DPJ was able to become a ruling party by achieving the DPJ's successful victories in 2007 Upper House and 2009 Lower House elections. Indeed, the DPJ's policy stance could not vary greatly from that of LDP's. Japan has recently shown much more consolidated political

conservative forces after entering the Abe's administration term. While the progressive political parties are weakened, the conservative parties are exercising a dominant power within the political system (Park, 2015). The 2012 general election marked the return of conservative authority of Japan's political system by LDP and its leader Abe.

Figure 1. House of Representatives of DPJ Member's Home Districts²⁴




Figure 2. HR DPJ Members' Home Districts (2000–2009)

²⁴ Source: Sasada (2013).

4.2. Japanese Agricultural Policymaking under Agrarian “*Organized Vote*”

Needless to say again, agricultural issue is one of the greatest hurdles to overcome between Japan and its trading partners on the trade negotiations (Mulgan, 2013). Various structural obstacles in the agricultural trade policymaking process have prevented the necessarily delivering benefits from free trade of other business sectors. The LDP as a dominant party for several decades bring the electoral strategy aimed at providing agricultural interests and preserving its constituency bases in the agricultural regions. Japanese farmers are also well-mobilized and being as influential political force united within central and local agriculture cooperatives, which primarily gather interest representation of farmers’ concerns. The reasons why farmers can wield such great political force lies in a mix of organizational, electoral and party political factors representing the best-known characteristics of Japanese domestic policymaking (Mulgan, 2013). To investigate the causes of the deadlocked KJFTA in Japan’s agricultural politics, this section covers the most recent traces for the iron-triangle interaction which are resistant to trade liberalization in Japan’s agriculture sector for the last decade. The thing is, the organized pressure from the iron-triangle interaction also affects to Abe’s initiative of agricultural reforms and TPP negotiations as similar barriers to the domestic hurdles toward KJFTA.

Regarding the relationships between politicians and interest groups in

policymaking, there is a term so-called “*organized vote*”. According to Köllner (2002), “organized voting” signifies the attainment of the capabilities of national interest groups to mobilize voters. The major interest groups such as trade unions, business federation and farmers’ cooperatives have been long targets for politicians and political parties who are looking for the power of multiple voting (Köllner, 2002). Therefore, the farmers’ associations, for example, has designated former high-ranking officials who would be nominated as candidates by political parties within the LDP. More specifically, agriculture cooperatives have assisted vote-mobilization efforts of political candidates through the elections while making recommendations, funding activities and mobilizing votes using its personal ties. In the last several elections, these efforts were proved to be effective enough to mobilize as many votes as possible. In other words, a close link of national interest groups and politicians (or political candidates) remains significant since the impact of involvement of interest groups in the elections has been a significant factor on vote-mobilization activities under the scope of “organized vote”. The following paragraphs cover the power of vote mobilization, lobbying activities, and funding contributions by iron-triangle actors in Japan’s agricultural politics in order to understand how the three key players, respectively or together, clearly affects to the Japan’s trade policymaking process.

4.2.1. Voting Mobilization

Japan's agricultural policymaking has been mainly dominated by LDP by representing agricultural interests of Japanese society for much of the postwar period and the dominance has continued for the past decade. As I illustrated in the earlier chapter, except for the 2009 general election, LDP's electoral dominance existed in most years since 2003 when the KJFTA negotiations have initiated. This implies that mobilization of farmers' voters in support of agricultural cooperatives group has been easily carried under the LDP's ruling period. Indeed, the LDP's long-standing pro-farmer bias and electoral dominance in rural districts are the traditional characteristics of Japanese political discourse. **Table 12** represents that the LDP particularly received the highest support from agriculture (3.69) and business and financial (3.80) based on the wide social interest coalition in favor of LDP support. These two groups have been the LDP's solid and broad base of electoral support and working as control measures on unfavorable trade negotiations to them.

Table 12. Party Support by Type of Interest Group (1980)²⁵				
Interest group	LDP	JSP	CGP	JCP
Agricultural	3.69	2.65	2.52	2.30
Business and Financial	3.80	2.15	2.15	1.52
Note: The numbers shown are the average score of each category of interest group based on responses of individual interest groups, placing themselves on a scale of 1 (least support) to 5 (most support).				

Nokyo, as the head of agricultural associations, it represents the aggregate of farmers' interests and it remains as a potent force in Japanese agricultural policymaking. Nokyo's branches are ubiquitous in Japanese rural society. Almost all of farm households belong to their local agricultural cooperatives. That is, farmers belong to Nokyo first and Nokyo works as a business and service organization for farmers. There are 3 million farming households in Japan and it will be a total of 5 million people with JA regular membership and 4.5 million people with JA associate membership (**Figure 2**). As of 2014, members of Japan's agriculture cooperative are about ten million people in total²⁶. Furthermore, JA cooperatives employ about 300,000 people and if it includes their families together, more than 600,000 people have direct ties to the Nokyo organizations as employees. All these populations interact with numerous JA's activities producing immense power to agricultural politics.

²⁵ Source: Muramatsu and Krauss (1987) modified by author.

²⁶ Source: MAFF(*Norinsuisansho*) 「総合農協統計表 (H26, 2014年)」.

JA cooperatives consist of numerous numbers of small-farm households and part-time farmers. Notably, JA much favors part-time farmers because they give a disproportionately strong voice in the organization. JA's business largely benefits from part-timers' deposits, which include earning from the non-farming activities and profits from of farmland converted to other uses. As illustrated in **Table 13**, part-time farmers overwhelmingly outnumber full-timers in Japanese agriculture industry. Borrowing Yamashita's words (2009), "From the organization's standpoint having 1,000 part-time farmers is far preferable to having 10 full-time farmers." More than 60 percent of all farmers are classified as "Type2 part-timers," meaning that they earn the majority of their income from non-farming activities. The numbers of households in this category recently shows a significant drop, from 1.98 million in 1990 to 0.72 million in 2015. The demographic change of aging population contributes to the sharp decrease. Besides, 71 percent of farmers who grow rice for all or most of their income are already aged 65 or older.

Figure 2. Membership Share of Japan's Agriculture Cooperatives²⁷




Table 13. The Numbers of Farm Households in Japan²⁸

販売農家数 (unit: million household)	2005	2010	2015
Full-time (専業農家)	44.3 (22.5%)	45.1 (27.6%)	44.3 (28.9%)
Type1 part-time (第1種兼業農家)	30.8 (15.7%)	22.5 (13.7%)	16.5 (17.6%)
Type2 part-time (第2種兼業農家)	121.2 (61.7%)	95.5 (58.5%)	72.2 (53.3%)

Today, rice accounts for only 17 percent (2014) of the total value of Japan's agricultural production. However, over 70 percent of the nation's

²⁷ Source: MAFF (*Norinsuisansho*) 「総合農協統計表」.

²⁸ Source: MAFF (*Norinsuisansho*) 「農林業センサス」.


Note: According to MAFF's explanation, "Type1 part-time" farmers are primarily farming workers, and "Type2 part-time" farmers are primarily non-farming workers.

commercial farmers are belong to rice farming households. This disparity reflects both the overall inefficiency of rice farming and the large portion of part-time and small-scale farmers in the rice farming, compared to other businesses of agricultural industry (Yamashita, 2009). Even though Japan's agriculture cooperatives have suffered several challenges due to demographic changes, deregulation efforts, the electoral reform and growing divisions within its membership between part-time and full-time farmers (Yamashita, 2003; Mulgan, 2005; Amyx, 2000), the farming group still has a strong influence as organized agrarian power even after post-agricultural reforms.

The farmers' politics exists with the LDP's dominance in the agricultural network in rural areas and the farmers' organizations such as Nokyo are closely attached to LDP politicians. The agricultural cooperatives have united the electorally overrepresented farm block within their membership (Mulgan, 2013). Nokyo's electoral power, therefore, has been enhanced by the overrepresentation of sparsely populated rural districts where the political significance of farm vote has been highlighted. The national impact index of agriculture cooperatives (**Figure 3**) shows its long-lasting influence for the last decade despite the decline of Nokyo members and agricultural population due to aging society problem. It suggests that prefectures with agriculture-intensive industry are more likely to have stronger influences of agriculture cooperatives in the area. Besides, the LDP

agricultural zoku politicians largely monopolize those local constituencies. This primarily links the LDP *norin* zoku members to their regional electoral support, particularly with the farming groups (Mulgan, 2013).

Figure 3. National Impact Index of Japan's Agriculture Cooperatives²⁹



Notes: 農協の政治力 = 農協組合家族の人口（個人正組合員 & 准組合員の総合数） / 20歳以上の全人口. (組合員数に法人会員数は除外)

According to the analyses, prefectures with traditionally strong power of Nokyo and LDP in the agricultural regions during the last decade³⁰ are

²⁹ Refer to 森島 賢「農協の県別政治力」JA 農協共同組合新聞コラム (2015/03/16) and calculated by author by referring to 農林水産省「総合農協統計表(H26)」 & 総務省統計局「人口推計」. Please also see Appendix VI [National Impact Index of Agriculture Cooperatives] categorized by each prefecture and in relevant years.

³⁰ See Appendix VII [Prefectures with Strong Influences of Nokyo & LDP in the Agricultural Regions seen in 2000s General Elections].

categorized as follows: Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima, Niigata, Toyama, Fukui, Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka, Wakayama, Tottori, Shimane, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime, Kochi, Saga, Oita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima Prefectures. Again, in these agricultural constituencies, LDP agricultural zoku politicians have overwhelmingly occupied as their traditionally strong electoral support bases. Only except for the year of 2005, when Komeito lost a number of seats within the LDP-Komeito coalition government, farmers' representative Nokyo has maintained a high-level of influence in those regional areas. Clearly, the LDP's defeat of general elections in 2009 and 2012 were not so influential in maintaining the power of agricultural cooperatives. Indeed, due to the demographic change, the power of farmers' organized power through Nokyo group is gradually shrinking than the past, but more precisely, it is still influential enough to affect Japan's agricultural politics.

While the agricultural population and agricultural industrial capability have been declining, as an aggregate agrarian power, Nokyo's political influence represents a different trend from it. The answer can be founded in the change of electoral system. In the SMD system electing the House of Representatives, generally two candidates compete for a seat, so even if there is a slim majority such as only 1%, it turns into a wide margin up to 2%. It is not so easy to recover from losing votes. Although the agricultural vote has no full power to put a

candidate into an electoral victory, however, it has an enough power to defeat an opponent under the SMD system. That is, for political candidates, even 1% of agricultural vote ought not to lost unconditionally³¹. By examining the last four general elections between 2005 and 2012, those candidates who showed a 1% majority between two candidates in House of Representative elections (SMD) are assumed: first, the slim majority happens a lot in the urban or semi-rural constituencies where the LDP politicians have a relatively weak political leverage; secondly, those constituencies usually have a large floating votes that the farming vote does not particularly stand out. The results of the 2005 & 2009 elections that were the LDP's defeat indicate that the number of lost seats by a 1% margin mostly correspond to the LDP's sudden lost in competitive political market between LDP and DPJ candidates (**AppendixVIII**)³².

Even if it is an only 1% margin of polling rates, big politicians could easily lose vested interests. Such a small portion of voting rates determines an election victory in the SMD system. Take it inversely, the agrarian constituency shows a much more solid electoral support for political candidates in many rural areas, and thereby, it has been overrepresented in the Diet. This malapportionment allowed

³¹ Refer to 朝日新聞デジタル「農協や農林族議員の政治力は落ちたのか？」(2013/11/11)
(<http://webronza.asahi.com/business/articles/2013111000001.html?returl=http://webronza.asahi.com/business/articles/2013111000001.html&code=101WRA>)

³² See AppendixVIII
[Cases of 1% Majority between Two Candidates in House of Representative Elections (SMD)].

the rural-based LDP dominance for last decades since after the electoral reform. Therefore, agricultural zoku members have plentiful incentives to support agricultural protection in exchange for votes, funding, and campaign support activities from their traditional farmers' constituencies. These political environments became the primary reason why Japanese politicians have maintained a strong commitment to protect the domestic agriculture. All these facts based farmers' vote-mobilizing capabilities have successfully resulted in the government's protectionist trade policies for last several decades.

4.2.2. Lobbying Activities

The agricultural organized lobbying by politicians and bureaucrats and its led-private diplomacy have maintained close ties between the agricultural zoku giin and MAFF bureaucrats. MAFF bureaucracy has often had close contacts during their official careers with well-organized interests that can mobilize funds and votes at the constituency-level (Mulgan, 2013). The agricultural zoku Diet members strongly request its demand for protection of specific agricultural products during FTA negotiations (Mulgan, 2005; Solis, 2010). Besides, the dual-office holding by farm politicians between ministerial office in the cabinet, the agriculture-related committees in MAFF, and with the LDP are commonly reflected in the Japanese political society. It enables them to exert influence in the agricultural policymaking system of the ruling LDP for a long time (Mulgan, 2013). Many of agricultural zoku members are occupied by people who used to be cabinet officials or former Nokyo officials. They usually belong to either agriculture-related standing committee, in other words, *Norinsuisan-iinkai* (農林委員会) of House of Representatives or that of House of Councilors and take a leading position to discuss agricultural policymaking with MAFF bureaucrats.

For instance, Mitsuhiro Miyakoshi who is having the seventh term of House of Representatives from Toyama prefecture and taking on the union president of LDP's Toyama Prefecture. He served to the administrative official of

MAFF in 2012 and became the vice-minister of MAFF in the Cabinet in 2005 and also served to the chairman of *Norinsuisan-iinkai* of House of Representatives in 2007-2008. Another case, Tosio Yamada, is also Toyama prefecture birth who is having the second term of House of Councilor of LDP and responsible for a vice chairman of LDP's policymaking advisory board for House of Councilors. His former position was the executive director of JA-Zenchu and he also belonged to *Norinsuisan-iinkai* in the Diet as a chairman. As seen in the list of agriculture-related Diet members in the LDP³³, the dual-office holding is one of the most striking features in Japan's agricultural politics and many of the top positions of these offices are occupied by LDP *zoku giin* members.

To see the list of members of agriculture-related standing committee (*Norinsuisan-iinkai*) in both houses³⁴, a lot of LDP Diet members who were elected by the support of Nokyo, specifically *Noseiren* (農政連), take charge of PARC and the Agricultural and Forestry Division and the Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee (*Norin-Bukai* (農林部会) & *NorinsuisanSenryaku-Chousakai* (農林水産戦略調査会)) simultaneously. These agricultural *zoku giin* of the LDP have utilized its broadly based connections with

³³ See Appendix X [The List of Agriculture-related Diet Members in the LDP (Dual-office holding between LDP and the Diet)].

³⁴ See Appendix IX [The Members' List of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Standing Committee in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors].

farm constituency and agricultural cooperatives by lobbying activities to represent agricultural interests. JA group has a political group, called “*Zenkoku Noseiren* (全国農政連)” (hereafter “noseiren”) and has supported the LDP politicians by officially recommending the list of political candidates to farmers at every election time. Particularly, each prefectural noseiren (県農政連)³⁵ publicizes its supporting candidates in PR seats. It is also easily found that LDP agriculture zoku *giin* receives a recommendation from each prefectural noseiren.

It is easy to find a number of cases that LDP politicians have the support for noseiren: Norikazu Suzuki³⁶, who represents a constituency of the second district in Yamagata prefecture, was a MAFF officer in the past and is now in charge of the acting chairman of *Norin-bukai*. He officially got a prefectural noseiren’s recommendation before the 2014 election and he was also supported by Abe Shinzo, who is a head of LDP and the Cabinet. Seisi Baba³⁷, who is a member

³⁵ The list of prefectural *Noseiren* (各県農協政治連盟): 北海道農協政治連盟、岩手県農協政治連盟、宮城県農協政治連盟、秋田県農協政治連盟、山形県農協政治連盟、福島県農協政治連盟、茨城県農協政治連盟、栃木県農協政治連盟、群馬県農協政治連盟、埼玉県農協政治連盟、東京都農政推進連盟、神奈川県農政推進連盟、福井県農政連、岐阜県農協農政連盟、愛知県農政連盟、滋賀県農政連盟、京都府農協政治連盟、奈良県農協農政連盟、愛媛県農政同志会、長崎県農政連盟、熊本県農業者政治連盟、宮崎県農民連盟、鹿児島県農民政治連盟、沖縄県農業政治連盟等。

³⁶ Refer to 朝日新聞「小選挙区、自民が3議席独占 2005年以来、投票率は最低 衆院選 /山形県」(2014/12/15).

³⁷ Refer to 朝日新聞「自民・馬場氏が初当選 経済政策の継続訴え 参院選 /熊本」(2013/07/22).

of the House of Councilors having an electoral base of Kumamoto prefecture, also received prefectural noseiren's support during elections. He owed the Kumamoto's electoral support in the expectancy of Nokyo to oppose government's stance on the TPP negotiations. Besides, he well capitalized on his twenty-two years career of the city councilor and his home's agricultural experiences. Another Kumamoto's representative, Tetsushi Sakamoto³⁸, who serves for his 5th term of the House of Representative also gained a prefectural noseiren's support in preparation for the TPP negotiations and the Nokyo's reform. Ryosuke Kouzuki³⁹, who currently serves for a vice-minister of LDP's *Norinbukai*, was recommended by Ibaraki prefectural noseiren and gained LDP's official approval in the last election for the House of Councilors.

Kazuo Yana⁴⁰, received a recommendation by Tochigi prefectural noseiren. Tochigi prefecture is the 8th rank of national rice crop, so citizens have high attention in agricultural policies. Kazuo Yana represents the farmers' interest, particularly for the opposition against TPP in the *Norinsuisan-iinkai* of the Diet. Hinako Takahashi, Shunichi Suzuki, and Takashi Fujiwara⁴¹ are members of the

³⁸ Refer to 朝日新聞「自民4堅持、次世代1「非自民共闘」支持広がらず 衆院選 /熊本県」(2014/12/15).

³⁹ Refer to 朝日新聞「前副知事の上月氏、農政連が推薦へ 参院選 /茨城県」(2013/01/25).

⁴⁰ Refer to 朝日新聞「(2014 衆院選)「威光」に切り込む自民「TPP反対」支持取り込む 栃木3区」(2014/12/10).

⁴¹ Refer to 朝日新聞「自3・民2・生2氏、県農政連が推薦決定 TPP阻止・米価対策で 衆院選 /岩

House of Councilors representing Iwate prefecture, all recognized by Iwate prefectural noseiren. In addition, Jiro Aichi, Hidehisa Otsuji, and Ichita Yamamoto⁴² each representing Miyagi, Kagoshima, and Gumma prefecture as the House of Councilors for a long period received solid support by prefectural noseiren in order to express their concerns toward TPP negotiations. Interestingly, Tomomi Inada⁴³, who is now responsible for Nokyo's reform as the chairman of PARC within LDP, also has the backing of prefectural noseiren. She is in her 4th term of the House of Representative representing Fukui prefecture. Although there are conflicting views within JA Fukui, the Nokyo's chairman clarified that there is no good alternative for protecting their interests. In the 2012 House of Representative election when the Abe administration resumed, about half of candidates (162 out of 294) elected were publicly recommended by JA Noseiren. Including the farmers' votes, the agricultural cooperatives have helped the agricultural zoku politicians to be seated in the Diet⁴⁴. In this way, the official

手県」(2014/12/02).

⁴² Refer to 朝日新聞「(2013参院選@宮城)農協 反TPP、疑心暗鬼 党と候補者、主張ねじれ」

(2013/07/09)

& 朝日新聞「参院選序盤の情勢 選挙区<中国・四国・九州・沖縄>」(2013/07/06)

& 朝日新聞「(2013参院選@群馬)県興農政連、山本氏推薦を見合わせ 農家に配慮」(2013/06/15).

⁴³ Refer to 朝日新聞「(2014衆院選)農政不満、宙に漂う」(2014/12/12).

⁴⁴ Refer to 朝日新聞「農協改革：3 自民農林族、苦肉の妥協策」(2014/07/11).

approval by LDP and the recommendation activities of prefectural as well as national noseiren unquestionably guarantee the success of agricultural zoku giin's election victory.

The election results of the House of Councilors especially over the past few years demonstrate the relationships between the official recommendations of noseiren and LDP's approval rating. It reveals an overall flow of the ups and downs of farmers' votes depending upon the cabinet's agricultural policies and the LDP's political stance on it. In short, when the LDP defeated at election, the LDP-Noseiren relations shows a weaker-level of alliance in the election period. It is because members of agricultural cooperatives behave as a rational political player by selecting the most favored candidates according to policy promises, not wholly depending on their party affiliation. When the issue of structural reforms on Nokyo and Japan's TPP participation emerged, Nokyo promptly reacted against Abe administration's decision who is also the head of LDP and this brought to the loss of some LDP's seats in the last election.

In the 2004 election⁴⁵, the enthusiastic sensation toward the so-called Koizumi Boom turned into criticism against the Koizumi's structural reforms, therefore LDP politicians struggled from the lost, while DPJ candidates succeeded to occupy many seats in different regions. The election accelerated Japan's two

⁴⁵ Refer to 朝日新聞「小泉ブーム、夢の跡 風受けた民主上昇 参院選【西部】」(2004/07/12).

party system between LDP and DPJ in 2000s. The 2007 & 2010 Upper House election⁴⁶ were well-known for LDP's total defeat and the results represents the losing constituencies which have been traditionally strong to LDP politicians. For instance, Akita, Aomori, Kumamoto, Yamanashi, Aiichi, Yamagata, and Miyazaki prefectures declared to cast the independent vote. National noseiren withdrew its support for LDP in PR seats and few prefectural noseirens did express their support for DPJ candidates. Consequently, LDP zoku politicians underwent two elections amid a mounting sense of crisis without reliable support of Nokyo. Fortunately, LDP regained the electoral victory in the 2013 Upper House election⁴⁷, however, the return of LDP could not back the old days' seating rates. Indeed, the alliance between noserien and LDP has become weaker and LDP candidates were not able to get high number of votes.

Nokyo acknowledges the necessity of pipe that connects farmers and the ruling party in order to attain agricultural demands. However, recently agricultural groups rose up against Japan's declaration to join TPP. It is clear that JA group's leave from LDP to a certain degree and LDP regional candidates are experiencing

⁴⁶ Refer to 朝日新聞「農政連、自民支援せず 40年来の方針転換 今夏の参院選」(2010/03/23). & 朝日新聞「農協票、各地で争奪戦 政権党か、過去の情か 夏の参院選挙区」(2010/03/24). & 朝日新聞「(2010参院選かながわ) 農政連が民・自とも推薦 千葉氏と小泉氏決定」(2010/06/01).

⁴⁷ Refer to 朝日新聞「(2013参院選@滋賀) 業界団体、相次ぎ「自民回帰」 / 滋賀県」(2013/07/19). & 朝日新聞「農協、自民離れ TPPに反発、推薦難航 参院選」(2013/06/07).

difficulties to get a Nokyo's recommendation and support. On the other hand, on behalf of the agrarian interests in policymaking, MAFF has exercised its veto power to interrupt trade negotiations. But, the impact of MAFF lobbying activities remains questionable since the process of trade negotiations are generally unreleased materials. Nevertheless, one fact is that MAFF can tell what the most important thing to protect their farmers is and this organ well takes advantage to collaborate with agricultural cooperatives in order to reach the same goal in the process of trade negotiations.


4.2.3 Funding Contributions

Nokyo, as the main political vehicle of the agricultural sector, functions as a pressure group that advances the interests of farmers, and besides it mobilizes farmers' votes and provides campaign funds to specific politicians, agricultural zoku in the LDP. On account of lacking privilege of party base, rice-roots organizations in the countryside, LDP candidates have relied on the organized power of Nokyo and its associated organizations in order to secure electoral constituencies in rural areas. Nokyo has provided an organizational means that LDP politicians can appeal and mobilize support from rural society (Mulgan, 2013). Nokyo has been carried out a variety range of political activities aimed at resisting lower tariffs on agricultural imports on trade negotiations. With all support by Nokyo's branches and its businesses, farmers group was able to build a solid constituency to fund the agricultural zoku *giin* as well as make abundant political funds. Those prefectures where the Nokyo's power in each prefecture is strong have lots of farmers' votes as many as Nokyo's members exist.

Nokyo consists of various business organs at national-level and associated sub-unions at prefectural-level (**Figure 4**). To be specific, JA Zenchu as the peak association of Nokyo has controlled over agricultural cooperatives. JA Zenno runs agricultural economy businesses, for example, it gathers farm products produced by JA members and sells to the market. The JA Zenno's total volume of business

is well over four trillion yen. Norinchukin, another important JA business, consists of JA Credit Union and JA Bank functioning as a financial agency of Nokyo. The members of JA Bank (715 in total) are made of 681 of JA, 33 of JA Credit Union, and Norinchukin as of April, 2015. On the one hand, JA Zenkokuren is responsible for JA members' welfare having 34 unions at each 33 prefectures in national. It manages 110 of hospitals, 65 of clinics, 22 of health checkup center for agricultural areas, 32 of health facilities for the Elderly, 106 of visiting nursing facilities, 7 of special nursing home for the Elderly, 9 of home-care support center, 14 of regional comprehensive support center, and 15 of nursing school in the name of JA as of 2015. In addition, JA group owns various kinds of businesses all over Japan such as tourist business, newspaper & publishing business. These organizational structure of JA and its business scale contributed to build a solid constituency and became a reliable source for agricultural zoku Diet members by securing ample political funds. The JA's overall authority through a variety of businesses indeed retains enormous influences to Japanese society irrespective of regions.

Figure 4. Major Structure of Japan's Agriculture Cooperatives⁴⁸



Not only prefectural noseirens officially do recommendations for specific candidates to farmers and JA members, they also officially support the agricultural zoku *giin* by distributing political funds. The political funds are collected from each prefectural-level of noseiren as well as various fundraising party and agricultural policy research groups. This money comes from the membership fees of respective local agriculture cooperatives into prefectural-level of JA national federations (**Figure 5**). These political funds contribute to support LDP politicians

⁴⁸ Source: JA Group Homepage (<http://org.ja-group.jp/>) and modified by author. Also refer to 農林水産省「農業協同組合等現在統計」(平成26年度) & 農林水産省「総合農協統計表」(平成26年事業年度).

in both houses, who has a tight connection between farmers' interests and their political careers. The flow of this money was proved to be practical and substantial according to my research on the pattern of "Noseiren's funding record in the period of three years during 2013-2015 (**Table 14**)". Indeed, political funding by Nokyo is largely channeled through the farmers' political leagues, which continue to make donations to politicians and parties (Mulgan, 2013). This enables them legally to make political donations. Specifically, prefectural noseiren officially and continuously is funded by various agricultural study groups, and also sponsors LDP *norin zoku* members. Among the noseiren's annual revenues for last three years, 16 percent was donated by each prefectural noseiren, about 7 percent was collected from political funds party, and 15-22 percent funding comes from agriculture-related study groups. Then, 10-15 percent spending went to LDP candidates as political funds who run for PR seats in the House of Councilors.

Figure 5. The Structure of Agriculture Cooperatives & Flow of Political Funds⁴⁹




Table 14. 農政連の政治資金規模 (平成25～27年)

	平成27年(2015)	区分	名称	金額(円)
項目			収入総額	134,405,197
(収入)	寄附	政治団体	各県農協政治連盟	22,500,000
	その他の事業収入		第1～6回農業政策研究会	10,200,000
			第1～12回農業復権研究会	20,520,050

⁴⁹ Refer to *The Huffington Post*. Taro Yamada, a member of House of Council. 「ALL与党で、族議員だらけ。族の怖さを垣間見た！」 (http://www.huffingtonpost.jp/taro-yamada/all-councilor_b_7574288.html)

Table 14. (Continued)				
	政治資金パーティー	法人	全国農業協同組合中央会 (第2~6回農業政策研究会 支援)	7,000,000
		法人	全国農業協同組合中央会 (第5,7,9回農業復権研究 会)	3,800,000
(支出)			支出総額	45,523,134
	寄附 (受領者)自由民主党東京都参議院比例区第三十四支部			20,000,000
	平成26年(2014)	区分	名称	金額(円)
項目			収入総額	134,405,197
(収入)	寄附	政治団体	各県農協政治連盟	24,500,000
	その他の事業収入		第1~6回農業政策研究会	10,900,000
			第1~12回農業復権研究 会	11,300,000
	政治資金パーティー	法人	全国農業協同組合中央会 (第2~6回農業政策研究会 支援)	7,500,000
		法人	全国農業協同組合中央会 (第6,10,11回農業復権研 究会)	3,900,000
(支出)			支出総額	54,659,395
	寄附 (受領者)自由民主党東京都参議院比例区第三十四支部			14,000,000
	平成25年(2013)	区分	名称	金額(円)
項目			収入総額	139,166,604
(収入)	寄附	政治団体	各県農協政治連盟	22,000,000

	その他の事業収入		第1~6回農業政策研究会	11,100,000
			第1~12回農業復権研究会	12,600,000
	政治資金パーティー	法人	全国農業協同組合中央会 全国共済農業協同組合連合会 (第2~6回農業政策研究会支援)	7,900,000
		法人	全国農業協同組合中央会 (第4,5,6回農業復権研究会)	4,500,000
(支出)			支出総額	61,749,650
	寄附 (受領者)自由民主党東京都参議院比例区第三十四支部			22,000,000

Note: There is a limit to figure out every year of Noseiren's political funds since only three years of data is open.

Source: 東京都選挙管理委員会事務局 『政治資金収支報告書』.

Tokyo Metropolitan Government Home Page (<http://www.senkyo.metro.tokyo.jp/>)

In conclusion, it is evident that LDP agricultural zoku Diet members are strong to MAFF bureaucrats, Nokyo is strong to LDP agricultural zoku politicians, and MAFF bureaucracy is strong to Nokyo. This triple alliance of agriculture policymaking agents has represented a solid and unbreakable tie in Japanese political society. This phenomenon has applied to overall Japan's trade negotiations and it is also applicable to today's hot potato such as Nokyo's reform and the TPP issue. Furthermore, the LDP agricultural zoku group relies on the Nokyo's constituents, Nokyo expects to gain political funds from MAFF, and finally MAFF anticipates support from LDP agricultural zoku politicians. Each

political player enjoys a vested interest in agricultural policymaking and the cooperative structure has been getting organized and influential in Japan⁵⁰. On the other hand, the consolidation of corporatized alliance and institutionalization of agricultural policy subgovernments ultimately undermine the dynamics of flexible policymaking in Japan's trade politics (Mulgan, 2013).

⁵⁰ 産経デジタル「日本農業に根を張る族議員、農協、官僚の三くすみ 構造改革のカギは？」(2014/06/07)(<http://www.zakzak.co.jp/society/domestic/news/20140607/dms1406071100003-n1.htm>)

4.3. The Agriculture Politics of Japan: The Past, Present and Changes

The corporatized politics by iron-triangle policymaking in the agricultural sector evidently contribute to a stalemate of trade negotiations including KJFTA. However, as other experts assessed, the solid power of organized votes in agricultural politics is likely to gradually weaken compared to the past. With the recent government-led changes in Japan's foreign economic policymaking, it might lead to a weaker corporatized alliance than before. The political environments based on Abe's initiative on new national strategy and structural reforms have established a positive ground to break through the deadlocked trade negotiations. Japan's declare to join TPP shows a good example of Japan's changed attitude toward trade liberalization. To put the conclusion first, however, the corporatist alliance in agricultural policymaking likely remains undiminished, despite the new mitigating factors. The illustrated positive signs are not specifically applied to the case of KJFTA negotiations yet, mainly because of Japan's non-concessional and unbreakable agricultural policymaking actors. At this moment, the influence of farmers' organized votes through the iron-triangle interaction still has a strong tendency to protect Japan's agricultural industry in trade policymaking.

This section briefly looks over the development of agricultural politics with a change of Japan's electoral system and depending on cabinet's policy stance

in last decades. Japan's electoral system before 1994, it maintained a multimember-district system with a single non-transferable vote (MMD/SNTV) implying that more than one candidate within the same party was set for the electoral competition. Thus, intra-party competition encouraged political candidates to utilize pork barreling tactic in giving particular subsidies to each constituency. It was very common for regional politicians, particularly among LDP politicians, to specialize their representative issues. It led a clientalistic relationship between politicians and supporting groups including voters. The zoku politicians were sensitive to the interests of the group they are associated with. For example, agricultural zoku politicians received strong support from Nokyo and thus, they often pressured the government to provide trade protection for farmers. This implies that regional politicians tended to focus much more on the interests of a small group of voters in their districts than on the interests of the median voters in their districts. In the pre-electoral system, therefore, it was relatively difficult for agricultural zoku politicians to possess tremendous political influences.


More recently, many Japanese politicians began to support the new agricultural policies symbolizing consumer-centered policy since the new electoral system encouraged them to advocate policies that would benefit the Japanese economy as a whole. On account of the new electoral system of the

House of Representatives which was introduced in 1994 with a mixed member system (MM) combining 300 single member districts (SMD) and 200 proportional representation (PR) seats, has dramatically changed incentives and campaign strategies of Japanese politicians (Sasada, 2008). Now political candidates must appeal to the voters on the quality of their policies, representing the interests of the median voter at the same time. Furthermore, the characteristic of pork-barrel politics is getting less attractive under the new electoral system, because only small and particular groups are benefits from pork-barrel policies. Accordingly, the political influence of the interest groups like Nokyo and Keidanren has been weakening than it used to be. In short, it makes politicians compete on policy differences rather than on personality ties to a particular interest group. The LDP's new agricultural policies pay attention to consumers away from traditional small-scale farmers (Sasada, 2008). Clearly, the 1994 electoral reform put a change in LDP's strategy of vote-mobilizing. In recent years, LDP therefore has begun to reduce its reliance on Nokyo. Abe's declaration of joining the TPP was a proper example of representing a change of farmer's politics. However, these new changes in agricultural policy turned out irrelevant stories to the case of KJFTA negotiations yet. Still the farmers' voting power are influential in agricultural policymaking process.

With this new trend, the agricultural export promotion policy first

appeared in 2003 (**Figure 6**)⁵¹ as opposed to the traditional defensive protectionist policies. Recently, the Abe administration also announced its plan to expand Japan's agricultural exports to 1 trillion yen by 2025 (**Figure 7**)⁵² (Sasada, 2008).

Figure 6. Government Budget for Agricultural Export Promotion Policies.




Source: The MAFF Annual Budget Report.

⁵¹ Source: Sasada (2008).

⁵² Source: Sasada (2008).

Figure 7. Agricultural Exports and the Government's Goals.



Source: The MAFF website.

Assuming the new changes bring a breakthrough against the biggest barrier in Japan's trade negotiations, however, still the KJFTA talks are almost solely deadlocked because of the continuity of corporatized iron-triangle alliance in Japanese agricultural politics and this blocks to achieve domestic consensus for the FTA. Furthermore, the recent efforts by the Japanese Cabinets, demonstrate how the difficult policymaking structure of Japan has been modified. PM Junichiro Koizumi actively pursued structural reforms on Japan's policymaking system focusing on weakening the role of LDP politicians as representatives of special interests. PM Koizumi deeply understood that the public got fed up with the old LDP leaders and system, especially about wasteful public works spending, and therefore he agreed to dismantle the old system of LDP (Vogel, 2006). As part of

its efforts, a new Council of Ministers concerned with the Japan's FTA was established in March 2004 to oversee the problem of agricultural trade liberalization and the promotion of economic partnerships. In December 2004, the Koizumi administration further adopted the first set of basic guidelines for signing FTAs.

Recently, current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who is a successor to Koizumi also actively pursued structural reforms of the trade policymaking process, mainly aiming to weaken the role of LDP politicians as representatives of special interests. Through these efforts which are started by the Koizumi's administration, the subgovernments have been struggling to dominate the agricultural policymaking process and therefore now its traditional pervasive dominance over trade issues became also unclear (Mulgan, 2008). As the structural reforms have not completely succeeded yet, the general trend of LDP led-policymaking still remains in Japanese trade politics. In light of these facts, the corporatized alliance of the interested parties in the agriculture policymaking definitely contribute to a current stalemate of the KJFTA in the discussions of agricultural liberalization in Japan.

CHAPTER V. THE UNBREKABLE DEADLOCK OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

5.1. Pragmatic approach by Abe's initiative on Japan's FTA Politics

During the campaign for the general election of 2003, both LDP as the ruling party and DPJ as the largest opposition party in Japan, declared their manifesto promises to the public in regard to proactive attitude towards FTAs with Asian countries, however the commitment was neither clear and consistent one (Ito, 2005). They also proposed far specific and detailed program of agricultural reforms, without mentioning its relations with international trade. With lacking serious interests of politicians in Japan, bureaucrats have prepared and discussed the framework within their fractional structure of governance. As a result, since 2002, government documents in a similar direction but in different interests have started to appear. For example, the White Paper on Trade, METI (2002), similar documents by MOF (2002), MOFA (2002), and Cabinet Office (2001) are applied to this category. While hoping a political leadership on decision making, the bureaucrats have sought their own initiatives to lead the politicians rationally (Ito, 2005). The comprehensive paper by MOFA (2002), followed and confirmed by the paper by Cabinet Office (2004) also reveal that the feature of "pragmatism" led by the bureaucrats clearly account for Japan's recent trade negotiation strategy.

Economic linkages and institutional cooperation in East Asia have

changed basic interests of MAFF bureaucrats and the LDP politicians and such changes brought a new move in Japan's FTA policy (Yoshimatus, 2007). In recent years, Japan's trade liberalization has gradually progressed after the experiences of several trade negotiations. The current LDP government under PM Shinzo Abe is strongly eager to achieve more trade agreements and ultimately Japan declared to join the TPP negotiations. This is possible partly because of the high popularity of PM Abe with his economic initiative, the so-called "Abenomics." (Sasada, 2013). However, the changes have not been realized in the agreement of KJFTA discussions yet. While the first FTA with Singapore (JSEPA) virtually excluded the agricultural sector, the second FTA with Mexico started to include agricultural items in the negotiations, and the coverage of products covered further expanded with the case of ASEAN. It represents Japan's "later-the-better" policy, and besides, FTA negotiations may still in questioning stage for Japan itself (Ito, 2005). Now, the bureaucratic pragmatism strategy under Abe administration has been turning to the topic of TPP under the pressures of economic hegemony between the United States and China. Japan's pragmatism is placed in a strategic situation of strengthening the alliance with US and promoting economic ties with China through the trilateral FTA simultaneously. The most important thing for Japan, is to enhance further regional integration with East Asia as a whole (Ito, 2005). Assuming the current situation, Japan seems to take pragmatism strategy to

cooperate with China without losing US's ally. Japan has been indecisive over the determination of trade negotiations in the case of KJFTA. Because of a clear domestic backlash surrounding the KJFTA, Japan does not want to lose their benefits or struggle for domestic interests regarding a FTA with Korea.

The Japan's new policy change is also explained by the promotion of Japanese agricultural products to overseas markets. The Abe administration announced its plan to expand Japan's agricultural exports to 1 trillion yen by 2025 (**Figure 7**). The following paragraphs covers the agricultural policy reform by introducing Abe's efforts on disentangle the iron-triangle dominance in agricultural policymaking of Japan. Unlike the past traditional protectionist policies for the domestic agricultural interests in last several decades, Japan is now fundamentally different from its protectionist agricultural policies. With this background, Japan's bureaucratic pragmatism under Abe's strong initiative would make the KJFTA negotiations face fewer difficulties in reaching the agreement. Since the second Abe administration has begun in 2013, the Japanese government strongly aims to raise its national growth to get out of long economic stagnation. For the reason, the FTA issues are comprehensively re-examined and actively discussed than before. The KJFTA case is one of the key subjects, and therefore one can expect the changed government strategy in FTA policymaking would lead to a practical outcome of negotiation in near future. The recent changes by the

Japanese government is specifically reflected in the progress of KCJ trilateral FTA and TPP negotiations.

Agricultural Policy Reform and Free Trade⁵³

On the other hand, PM Abe has insisted on substantial reforms on agricultural politics by weakening the influence of agriculture cooperatives to trade negotiations and it has been successfully done so far⁵⁴. In Japanese politics, rice is sacrosanct, so making an exception requires enough compensation at the same time. In the TPP negotiations, the Diet agricultural committees have adopted resolutions urging the government to have Japan's rice, wheat, beef and pork, dairy products and sugar exempted from the tariff elimination under TPP agreement and to leave the negotiation table if unable to do so. Then, who blocks TPP negotiations and agricultural policy reform? This can be the same answer with the case of KJFTA discussions. The strongest domestic backlash stems from JA who is the only legal organization of Japan which is able to make any kind of agricultural businesses such as sales of farm inputs and products, insurance, and banking. By pegging the rice price high with tariffs, JAs can not only get high commission in

⁵³ Reference: A special lecture given by Kazuhito Yamashita who is a research director of the Canon Institute for Global Studies, on "Agricultural Policy Reform & Free Trade" (2015) at Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo.

⁵⁴ 朝日新聞「農政改革、官民で推進 金融機関が参入 新次官に「改革派」」(2016/06/16).

proportion to price, but also maintain a lot of small-scale and part-time farmers who have been the sources of JA's political force and have deposited their earned income in JA Bank. So the JA organization as a whole, generate influential veto power in agricultural trade liberalization.

Under Abe administration, the proposed agricultural policy reform of JAs by the deregulation committee was made first in 2014 in order to disentangle the power of JAs. The proposal was watered down and the reform is left to the initiatives or judgments of JAs after the consultation between the government and the LDP which is also greatly influenced by JAs. But JAs is not able to control the process since the PM Abe insists on substantial reform of JA-Zenchu, which is called a Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives as the headquarters of JA's political activities. New agricultural reforms mainly aim to restrain the power of Japan's farm lobbying of Nokyo. The contents of reforms contain that the government weakens the authority of JA's peak body, JA-Zenchu, which has been a source of power of Nokyo, to supervise audits of local cooperatives, and tried to reorganize it into a general incorporated association like other industrial organizations. To be specific, it attempts to delete from the provisions of the Agricultural Cooperative Law concerning the national and prefectural unions of JAs which are authorized under the law to collect money from them. This absolutely reduces JA-Zenchu's political authority. Besides, the reform purposes

to convert JA-Zennoh, which engages in the processing and sales of agricultural produce collected from local JAs, into a joint-stock corporation.

5.2. Recent Progress on the KCJ Trilateral FTA & Japan's Participation in the TPP

It is also noteworthy that the recent progress of the KCJ trilateral FTA and Japan's joining the TPP membership can be another impetus for the progress of KJFTA while showing political initiatives of the Japanese government. Along with a tendency of deepening economic integration in East Asia, the importance of having a trilateral FTA has been steadily emphasized in establishing a stable ground of political cooperation as well as in strengthening economic ties among them, as key players in Northeast Asia. Because of the prevailing uncertainties in the global economy and a threat to China's rise of power with its huge economic power, today it becomes a common interest of East Asia and the world to achieve a deeper level of economic integration as a new growth engine of the world economy. In this regard, the KCJ trilateral FTA bears a political significance to three countries, not a merely symbol of economic cooperation in the East Asia region.

Until a recent date, Korea, China, and Japan have steadily held talks over the trilateral FTA despite political tensions. Unlike the case of KJFTA that the political disputes block the further discussions each time, the continuation of trilateral FTA talks represents a diplomatic success by paying the way for economic cooperation as well as political dialogues among countries. This fact

also demonstrates that a trilateral approach may allow three nations to do more what bilateral relations could not attain so far⁵⁵. Japan's careful attention to the trilateral FTA based on the recent proactive trade politics under Abe's initiative is highly admirable in this respect. The KCJ trilateral FTA is also a primary concern for Japan to open the way of having closer economic ties with China, with multilateral efforts toward East Asia. Achieving the trilateral FTA will definitely provide new opportunities to enhance the three countries' overall growth potential and establish a new diplomatic relations. In the midst of a "Asian paradox" appeared in Northeast Asia, again, surprisingly the trilateral track remains as a positive symbol to lead further economic cooperation and political dialogue. The two-track approach allowing bilateral and trilateral cooperation simultaneously would allow Northeast Asia to have a more pragmatic way to discuss economic and political subjects. The KJFTA ultimately should act as a next catalyst for facilitating cooperation within East Asia.

The KCJ trilateral FTA, which just had its 10th round of negotiations in last April, Seoul, is also of critical importance in light of East Asian hegemony. U.S. and China rivalry directly reflects in competing for an economic community formation in East Asia. The US-led TPP idea under Obama's "rebalancing"

⁵⁵ Refer to The Diplomat, "Northeast Asia Diplomacy: A Trilateral Way Forward?" (October 6th, 2014). (<http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/northeast-asia-diplomacy-a-trilateral-way-forward/>)

strategy⁵⁶, evidently excludes China, which magnifies the relative importance of the RCEP and the KCJ trilateral FTA for China. Meanwhile, Japan feels more pressure to progress on the trilateral front due to the fast-moving bilateral trade negotiations between China and Korea. Regarding the TPP negotiations, Japan uniquely expresses its participation in TPP membership such a broader and higher-level of trade negotiation embracing concessions over agricultural sector with a goal of eliminating tariff. The influence of agricultural politics seems apparently on the wane and it is well reflected in the case of Japan's joining to TPP⁵⁷. This implies that domestic political constraints of Japan might not be regarded as the biggest hurdle in trade negotiations in the future. Rather, the barriers are varied depending upon the issues. The JA's political body, Zenchu's loss by agricultural reforms will help facilitate the progress of TPP negotiations⁵⁸. In the similar context, this successful negotiation route toward the trilateral approach overcoming domestic constraints would positively affect to bilateral cooperation including the KJFTA talks and further regional economic integration in East Asia.

However, the more important fact we need to go over before discussing about the bright future, is that the iron-triangle interaction also applies to the issue

⁵⁶ Refer to The Diplomat, "What the TPP means for Japan?" (October 8th, 2015). (<http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/what-the-tpp-means-for-japan/>)

⁵⁷ Refer to The Diplomat, "The TPP and Japanese Agriculture." (July 23th, 2014). (<http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/the-tpp-and-japanese-agriculture/>)

⁵⁸ Refer to The Diplomat, "Agricultural Reforms in Japan Pave the Way for TPP." (February 12th, 2015). (<http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/agricultural-reforms-in-japan-pave-the-way-for-tpp/>)

of Nokyo's reform and even further TPP negotiations while producing a huge domestic hurdle in agricultural policymaking. The discussions on the agricultural reform, especially on Nokyo's reform have not been progressed well due to its conflicting views. There is a lack of cooperation of bureaucrats between ministries, understanding of many agricultural zoku *giins*, and persuasion of Nokyo as interested parties. Particularly, Nokyo has put its effort on mobilizing farmers' votes to elect agricultural zoku Diet members who are on its side. The 2014 general election results of the House of Representatives confirms that JA's national noseiren officially announced the support for LDP candidates in order to force them to apply pressure on the plan for the reform. 185 of 190 LDP candidates who received noseiren's recommendations were elected and it accounts for over 60 percent of LDP Diet members in total⁵⁹.

Nokyo also reacted vigorously to the challenge of the TPP issue, as seen in the 2014 general election results. Most prefectural noseirens insisted that their support for LDP agricultural zoku *giin* will help them to oppose the TPP negotiations in the Diet⁶⁰. Some candidates appealed to the members of Nokyo by emphasizing the gap between LDP's stance on TPP and Abe administration's

⁵⁹ Refer to 朝日新聞「大勝自民、農協改革に火種の精錬、候補者推薦で「踏み絵」」(2014/12/19).

⁶⁰ Refer to 朝日新聞「(2014衆院選 現場から問う) TPP 農家の期待と温度差」(2014/12/10).

initiative, and besides they pledged to protect farmers' interests⁶¹. For Nokyo, there is no choice but to rely on the promises of LDP politicians. Although there are several prefectures that decided not to recommend LDP candidates to farmers against Abe's decision, the traditional iron-triangle alliance in agricultural policymaking is not likely to break down so easily.

⁶¹ Refer to 朝日新聞「(2014衆院選) 公約と演説、自民ズレ 【西部】 熊本県」(2014/12/10).

CONCLUSION

The past Korea's FTA negotiations with Chile, Japan and the United States convinces us that the real obstacles of the KJFTA are not political, cultural, economic and historical barriers existing in East Asia, but the domestic constraints, stemming from the fierce political reaction of "the losers" in market opening (Ahn, 2006). In fact, the agricultural sector has been the most difficult issues for negotiations on the FTA between Korea and Japan until now. Since Japan has no comparative advantage on agricultural products than Korea's goods, thus Japanese farmers and related agricultural groups have kept opposing the KJFTA for the fear of losing their domestic interests. Still there has not been an enough consensus on the necessity of trade liberalization on the agricultural sector in both Korea and Japan. Even farmers, consumers, and politicians have little incentives to approve a free trade of agricultural sector through the FTA, thus it leads to block further negotiations of KJFTA.

Indeed, the negotiations of KJFTA have been experiencing more domestic difficulties in both economic and political impasses due to a conflict of interests. Japan has been suffering from prolonged economic stagnation, low growth rates, enormous public debts and high trade deficits, and all these made Japan have more tough domestic environments to discuss further economic cooperation with neighboring countries. Not only for the KJFTA, but other FTAs are also largely

controlled by the combined situations of economic and political issues surrounding complex domestic and international environments. However, as my research demonstrates, the achievement of FTA is more severely influenced by domestic political constraints. From the past dramatic experiences with the Korea-China FTA, this demonstrates that a strongest push force toward the conclusion of FTA truly comes from political initiatives by national leaders with various symbolic political significances.

The argument in this paper is clearly narrowed down in one direction: the causes of the deadlocked KJFTA negotiations are grounded on the continuity of corporatized iron-triangle alliance in Japan's agricultural politics. The political leverage of corporatized relations in the agricultural policymaking of Japan is still significant despite the recent promotion of agricultural reforms and political initiative under Abe administration. More specifically, the key players of Japan's agricultural politics can be represented by the iron-triangle interactions between agricultural zoku Diet members in the LDP, MAFF bureaucrats, and members of Nogyo. The close relationships have led to a huge domestic stalemate to the discussion of Japan's agricultural liberalization on trade including KJFTA. The three main agriculture-related activities successfully make the iron-triangle alliance resistant to trade liberalization in Japan's agriculture sector for the last decade. Furthermore, the organized pressure from the iron-triangle also affect to

Abe's initiative toward agricultural reforms and TPP negotiations as similar barriers to the domestic constraints of KJFTA. For these reasons, with such backgrounds of Japanese political structure, one can ensure that Japanese domestic political factors have been the biggest hurdles to further progress on KJFTA negotiations.

The iron-triangle of Japanese politics is also taken together to create the segmented corporatism (in other words, pluralist but segmented) of Japanese politics. The political leverage of corporatized relations of the interested parties within the subgovernments contribute a stalemate of the KJFTA discussions. Particularly, the segmented corporatism of iron-triangle alliance dominates the controversial issues on Japan's trade policymaking. Because of the lack of strong top-down authority and inter-sectoral coordination abilities by the top layer of government may cause to an obstacle for policymaking, particularly on the conflicting issue of KJFTA. In addition to Japanese case, Korea's past several FTAs also demonstrate that the final obstacle to conclude the agreement was a lack of "domestic consensus" without enough legitimacy. Therefore, the key of future agreement largely depends on how to solve these domestic political tasks by both the Japanese and Korean government.

If the values and potentials are seriously to be considered, the KJFTA should not be only discussed from the point of trade imbalance problem anymore.

If Japan is really aware of the total significance of Korea, it is note that Japanese politicians have to pay much attention to diplomatic sensitivity to achieve their strategic interests after overcoming domestic political barriers. Political leadership by national leaders is very significant to complement bureaucratic negotiation. Therefore, Japan and Korea's political leaders should play a crucial role in the conclusion of the bilateral FTA (Ahn, 2005). The leaders' role will be significant and each government will play an important role in persuading the people and ratifying the agreement. When the agreement of KJFTA is reached, it would lead a much more solid relationship between Korea and Japan. The turbulence-like relationship due to different point of views on diplomatic or historical issues will not control the entire cooperation between two countries anymore. When the diplomatic or political issues aggravate its relationship, the economic ties will support the cooperative mood between countries to some degree. Fortunately, the negotiation talks of KCJFTA have done smoothly until recently, and so whichever concluded FTA negotiation definitely will stimulate another one to conclude in the near future. By referring the neoliberal institutionalist theory, two FTAs would arrange a bigger ground for economic cooperation in East Asia region. Last but not least, the KJFTA hoping for having better economic and diplomatic environment will draw a much higher-level of cooperation as the closest neighboring countries beyond current diplomatic clashes.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I . LDP's Election Results for the House of Representatives (SMD) in 2000s

2000 年代自民党の衆議院議員選挙結果 (小選挙区 300 席)										
	第 43 回 (2003 年)		第 44 回 (2005 年)		第 45 回 (2009 年)		第 46 回 (2012 年)		第 47 回 (2014 年)	
区 分	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数
北 海 道	5(12)	1,225,935	8(12)	1,434,994	1(12)	1,206,605	11(12)	1,049,010	8(12)	1,038,978
青 森 県	4(4)	375,879	0(4)	388,588	3(4)	289,393	4(4)	334,664	4(4)	285,531
岩 手 県	1(4)	291,457	3(4)	299,545	0(4)	244,515	1(4)	224,646	1(4)	224,059
宮 城 県	3(6)	476,657	1(6)	628,851	1(6)	528,560	5(6)	460,671	5(6)	465,169
秋 田 県	1(3)	226,749	1(3)	236,309	0(3)	244,927	3(3)	262,267	3(3)	242,530
山 形 県	2(3)	225,355	0(3)	427,602	1(3)	316,408	2(3)	273,216	3(3)	276,295
福 島 県	3(5)	480,806	2(5)	560,560.46	0(5)	443,297.39	4(5)	402,135	3(5)	371,352

茨城県 栃木県 群馬県 馬場県	6(7)	764,332	1(7)	811,944	1(7)	644,591	5(7)	646,797	5(7)	702,415
	5(5)	569,703	0(5)	605,949	1(5)	387,347	4(5)	416,193	4(5)	450,926
	5(5)	542,102	0(5)	611,172.52	2(5)	546,804.04	5(5)	494,286	5(5)	446,905
埼玉県 千葉県 東京都 神奈川県	7(15)	1,138,953	3(15)	1,789,222	0(15)	1,357,706	13(15)	1,272,634	12(15)	1,400,091
	5(13)	1,197,655	1(13)	1,643,890	2(13)	1,253,712	11(13)	1,207,592.56	11(13)	1,265,183
	12(25)	2,299,464	1(25)	3,276,270	4(25)	2,596,298.00	21(25)	2,436,971.27	22(25)	2,561,262.776
	9(18)	1,726,126.57	0(18)	2,435,656.06	3(18)	1,778,461	14(18)	1,761,971.43	13(18)	1,852,678
新潟県 富山県 石川県	2(6)	510,524	3(6)	622,414	0(6)	513,595	6(6)	530,505	5(6)	479,515
	3(3)	329,319	0(3)	291,256	2(3)	322,183	3(3)	335,410	3(3)	291,974
	2(3)	314,480	0(3)	375,142	1(3)	339,257	3(3)	312,093	3(3)	258,389

福井県	3(3) 203,3 69	0(3) 240,9 38	3(3) 239,7 26	3(3) 213,6 96	2(2) 199,9 41
山梨県	2(3) 230,1 16	1(3) 179,5 65	0(3) 163,1 65	1(3) 160,1 32	0(2) 169,1 35
長野県	3(5) 474,3 70	2(5) 538,3 39	0(5) 464,9 31	3(5) 402,7 99	3(5) 360,4 30
岐阜県	5(5) 593,4 18	0(5) 532,0 57	2(5) 576,6 61	5(5) 546,4 91	5(5) 492,7 95
静岡県	4(8) 772,8 57	2(8) 1,000 ,366	0(8) 802,7 19	6(8) 796,5 20	6(8) 835,0 89
愛知県	3(15) 1,056 ,895	6(15) 1,722 ,809	0(15) 1,391 ,647. 00	13(15) 1,310 ,296	8(15) 1,357, 340
三重県	3(5) 417,8 07	2(5) 484,5 44	1(5) 422,7 70	3(5) 384,7 25	3(5) 385,8 94
滋賀県	1(4) 269,9 16	2(4) 321,4 92	0(4) 265,4 26	4(4) 249,3 18	4(4) 274,9 18
京都府	3(6) 508,5 68	3(6) 579,5 60	1(6) 407,9 83	4(6) 412,2 86	4(6) 417,5 14
大阪府	6(19) 1,111 .160. 026	2(19) 1,708 ,092. 84	1(19) 1,264 ,380. 37	3(19) 1,024 ,948. 49	9(19) 1,123, 936.3 91

兵庫 県	5(12)	813,1 21	0(12)	1,193 ,668	1(12)	958,5 65	8(12)	887,3 24	7(12)	854,7 82
奈良 県	2(4)	333,2 43	1(4)	369,8 97	1(4)	327,5 81	3(4)	305,9 88	3(4)	329,4 67
和歌 山 県	2(3)	178,7 04	0(3)	335,5 18	1(3)	260,6 89	2(3)	246,1 50	2(3)	239,3 61
鳥取 県	1(2)	160,1 83	0(2)	170,9 37	2(2)	202,7 80	2(2)	212,1 41	2(2)	169,6 84
島根 県	2(2)	263,4 52	0(2)	252,5 19	2(2)	257,8 91	2(2)	247,8 75	2(2)	223,9 60
岡山 県	5(5)	515,6 15	2(5)	483,9 69	2(5)	429,7 76	4(5)	429,2 79	4(5)	416,3 00
広島 県	6(7)	608,5 06	0(7)	660,6 12	1(7)	673,7 97	6(7)	665,1 96	6(7)	636,8 43
山口 県	3(4)	480,9 22	0(4)	509,3 47	3(4)	485,1 65.12	4(4)	466,0 65	4(4)	410,9 60.78 4
徳島 県	2(3)	202,6 79	1(3)	187,1 19	1(3)	189,7 91	3(3)	197,9 54	2(2)	178,1 45
香川 県	3(3)	249,4 71	0(3)	312,1 12	1(3)	244,2 45	2(3)	214,5 73	2(3)	207,7 14

愛媛県 高知県	4(4)	404,136	0(4)	461,111	3(4)	378,182.80	4(4)	329,654.71	4(4)	288,951.292
	3(3)	200,023	0(3)	197,836	3(3)	194,111	3(3)	201,236	2(2)	162,043
福岡県 佐賀県 長崎県 熊本県 大分県 宮崎県 鹿児島県	5(11)	1,054,347.00	1(11)	1,309,928	4(11)	1,286,342	10(11)	1,033,989	10(11)	1,015,132
	2(3)	276,837	0(3)	168,674	1(3)	248,399	3(3)	237,858	1(2)	197,495
	3(4)	395,857	1(4)	406,381	0(4)	364,247.00	4(4)	337,746	4(4)	306,493
	3(5)	484,562	1(5)	551,379	3(5)	501,556	4(5)	369,316	4(5)	368,682
	2(3)	349,021	1(3)	290,068	0(3)	300,581	3(3)	380,120	2(3)	281,127
	1(3)	99,969	0(3)	265,538	2(3)	252,475	3(3)	310,998	3(3)	309,072
	4(5)	506,230	0(5)	442,652	3(5)	493,684	4(5)	458,913.99	4(5)	404,265.679
沖縄県	2(4)	178,486	0(4)	201,366	0(4)	238,956	3(4)	262,041	0(4)	230,726

計	237(30 0)	26,08 9,327	52(300)	32,51 8,389 .92	64(300)	27,30 1,982 .07	237(30 0)	25,64 3,309 .44	222(29 5)	25,46 1,448. 922
		43.85 %		47.70 %		38.68 %		43.01 %		48.10 %
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (総務省)『選挙関連資料』										

**APPENDIX II . LDP's Election Results for the House of Representatives
(PR) in 2000s**

2000 年代自民党の衆議院議員選挙結果 (比例代表選挙区 180 席)					
	第 43 回 (2003 年)	第 44 回 (2005 年)	第 45 回 (2009 年)	第 46 回 (2012 年)	第 47 回 (2014 年)
区分	得票数	得票数	得票数	得票数	得票数
北海道	876,653	940,705	805,895	692,304	744,748
青森県	263,025	247,946	231,934	194,423	183,186
岩手県	242,318	242,946	173,030	150,075	167,149
宮城県	377,754	430,842	334,269	289,458	294,612
秋田県	249,242	243,641	209,978	181,537	172,976
山形県	269,816	290,477	219,146	184,330	200,995
福島県	392,129	446,088	323,404	238,893	246,454
茨城県	529,271	616,721	451,726	430,200	493,772
栃木県	403,353	440,671	257,297	243,262	293,628
群馬県	385,696	441,887	347,040	296,518	309,905
埼玉県	956,903	1,393,501	889,870	850,136	937,281
千葉県	924,991	956,284	858,313	766,472	861,787
神奈川 県	1,867,544	1,330,222	1,238,374	1,135,005	1,322,461
山梨県	1,364,185	192,786	136,873	118,566	137,361
東京都	457,974	2,665,417	1,764,696	1,626,057	1,847,986
新潟県	250,278	502,781	397,560	368,835	355,758
富山県	255,463	247,546	215,313	193,586	189,471
石川県	195,803	306,233	245,813	195,795	188,098
福井県	152,414	217,608	181,681	146,318	143,387
長野県	343,304	391,385	292,715	257,561	245,871
岐阜県	413,364	466,878	355,453	310,583	296,133
静岡県	692,755	821,058	591,108	528,201	581,089
愛知県	1,014,942	1,401,387	958,864	882,144	1,017,522
三重県	315,730	376,725	276,997	245,079	252,928

滋賀県	222,963	285,849	210,628	182,446	202,352
京都府	361,319	479,400	323,295	299,665	310,909
大阪府	1,052,567	1,636,731	994,098	852,061	875,897
兵庫県	788,770	1,080,391	698,011	655,008	702,468
奈良県	240,849	311,244	213,092	196,095	215,615
和歌山 県	166,713	209,594	153,327	140,730	134,765
鳥取県	117,612	119,882	117,168	112,542	97,057
島根県	173,990	161,516	171,276	147,210	139,341
岡山県	334,790	358,610	323,936	256,296	257,790
広島県	45,815	550,042	459,114	403,594	415,065
山口県	302,561	347,030	316,957	290,758	274,650
徳島県	143,334	158,575	141,081	103,984	98,142
香川県	183,409	226,862	191,415	159,429	154,075
愛媛県	266,694	319,753	278,611	218,085	201,906
高知県	114,614	116,556	108,487	85,695	93,062
福岡県	696,763	914,909	788,703	647,298	651,790
佐賀県	174,424	195,758	161,683	140,125	145,049
長崎県	260,428	291,706	237,460	206,342	193,522
熊本県	342,057	383,796	326,859	270,257	264,196
大分県	233,956	242,857	197,643	171,384	172,437
宮崎県	227,061	220,889	193,411	170,813	172,043
鹿児島 県	400,391	414,750	328,248	265,153	260,780
沖縄県	200,198	218,383	118,365	124,149	141,447
計	20,660,185 (34.96%)	25,887,798 (38.18%)	18,810,217 (26.73%)	16,624,457 (27.62%)	17,658,916 (33.11%)
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (総務省) 『選挙関連資料』					

**APPENDIXⅢ. LDP's Election Results for the House of Councilors
(Constituency) in 2000s**

2000 年代自民党の参議院議員選挙結果 (選挙区 73 席)										
	第 19 回 (2001 年)		第 20 回 (2004 年)		第 21 回 (2007 年)		第 22 回 (2010 年)		第 23 回 (2013 年)	
区 分	当選人 数 (定 数)	得 票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得 票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数
北 海 道	-	-	-	-	1(2)	757,4 63	1(2)	948,2 67	1(2)	903,6 93
青 森 県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	248,7 82	1(1)	287,3 85	1(1)	261,5 75
岩 手 県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	176,0 96	0(1)	197,1 37	0(1)	161,4 99
宮 城 県	-	-	-	-	1(2)	359,0 99	1(2)	265,3 43	1(2)	421,6 34
秋 田 県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	276,6 94	1(1)	328,7 71	1(1)	260,8 46
山 形 県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	238,5 15	1(1)	263,9 87	1(1)	272,7 79
福 島 県	-	-	-	-	1(2)	372,8 57.00	1(2)	338,2 65.00	1(1)	484,0 89

茨城県	-	-	-	-	1(2)	427,2 97	1(2)	499,5 66	1(2)	560,6 42
栃木県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	372,9 30	1(1)	324,7 90	1(1)	376,5 53
群馬県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	530,1 14.00	1(1)	558,6 59.00	1(1)	580,1 44
埼玉県	-	-	-	-	1(3)	684,2 70	1(3)	655,0 28	1(3)	1,000, 725
千葉県	-	-	-	-	1(2)	929,0 96	1(3)	909,5 18	2(3)	1,099, 512.0 0
東京都	-	-	-	-	1(5)	1,342, 851	1(5)	1,010, 514.0 0	2(5)	1,677, 048.0 0
神奈川県	-	-	-	-	1(3)	895,7 52.00	1(3)	982,2 20	1(4)	1,130, 652.0 0
新潟県	-	-	-	-	1(2)	403,4 97	1(2)	412,2 17	1(2)	456,5 42
富山県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	265,8 82	1(1)	322,7 39	1(1)	328,6 38
石川県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	286,1 85	1(1)	304,5 11	1(1)	321,2 86

福井県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	193,6 17	1(1)	212,6 05	1(1)	237,7 32
山梨県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	162,7 46	0(1)	183,2 65	1(1)	142,5 29
長野県	-	-	-	-	1(2)	301,6 35	1(2)	293,5 39	1(2)	365,1 15
岐阜県	-	-	-	-	0(2)		1(2)	425,5 94	1(1)	500,5 80
静岡県	-	-	-	-	1(2)	549,3 75	1(2)	554,4 59	1(2)	634,7 89
愛知県	-	-	-	-	1(3)	743,1 53	1(3)	918,1 87.00	1(3)	1,056, 145
三重県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	293,2 08	0(1)	293,5 02	1(1)	373,0 35
滋賀県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	263,0 67	0(1)	210,9 58	1(1)	305,8 72
京都府	-	-	-	-	1(2)	362,2 74	1(2)	308,2 96	1(2)	390,5 77
大阪府	-	-	-	-	1(3)	732,1 75.00	1(3)	706,9 86.00	1(4)	817,9 43.00

兵庫県	-	-	-	-	1(2)	869,5 68	1(2)	694,4 59	1(2)	868,0 69
奈良県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	252,7 68	0(1)	255,1 35	1(1)	354,6 58
和歌山県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	256,5 77	1(1)	273,9 60	1(1)	337,4 77
鳥取県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	135,2 33	1(1)	158,4 45	1(1)	160,7 83
島根県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	186,6 22	1(1)	222,4 48	1(1)	202,1 81
岡山県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	403,7 83	0(1)	325,1 43	1(1)	490,7 27
広島県	-	-	-	-	1(2)	389,8 81	1(2)	547,8 45	1(2)	521,7 94
山口県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	419,9 47	1(1)	421,0 55.00	1(1)	455,5 46
徳島県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	150,3 06	1(1)	142,7 63	1(1)	179,1 27
香川県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	194,8 04	1(1)	236,1 34	1(1)	233,2 70

愛媛県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	318,304	1(1)	351,624.00	1(1)	373,047.00
高知県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	154,104	0(1)	123,898	1(1)	159,709
福岡県	-	-	-	-	1(2)	791,152	1(2)	774,618	1(2)	958,042
佐賀県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	189,212	1(1)	256,673	1(1)	223,810
長崎県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	331,147	1(1)	344,182.00	1(1)	359,805
熊本県	-	-	-	-	1(1)	432,686	1(1)	393,674	1(1)	450,617
大分県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	199,523	0(1)	257,322	1(1)	250,915
宮崎県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	146,269	1(1)	303,711	1(1)	314,599
鹿児島県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	402,541	1(1)	437,740	1(1)	403,450.00
沖縄県	-	-	-	-	0(1)	249,136	1(1)	258,946	0(1)	261,392

計	-	-	40(73)	18,60 6,193. 00	39(73)	19,49 6,083. 00	47(73)	22,68 1,192. 00
	40. 97 %	43. 85 %		31.35 %		33.38 %		42.74 %
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (総務省)『選挙関連資料』								

**APPENDIX IV. LDP's Election Results for the House of Councilors (PR) in
2000s**

2000 年代自民党の参議院議員選挙結果 (比例代表選挙区 48 席)					
	第 19 回 (2001 年)	第 20 回 (2004 年)	第 21 回 (2007 年)	第 22 回 (2010 年)	第 23 回 (2013 年)
区分	得票総数	得票総数	得票総数	得票総数	得票総数
北海道	-	-	723,442	601,801	733,066
青森県	-	-	203,185	198,915	212,354
岩手県	-	-	155,005	149,114	196,201
宮城県	-	-	274,691	273,530	313,029
秋田県	-	-	221,578	155,496,806	198,318
山形県	-	-	211,079	170,244	226,770
福島県	-	-	284,770	221,971	305,098
茨城県	-	-	384,101	353,401	445,077
栃木県	-	-	294,801	200,166	257,987
群馬県	-	-	338,829	268,857	356,608
埼玉県	-	-	833,543	653,497	964,515
千葉県	-	-	744,718	636,738	834,215
神奈川県	-	-	1,539,810	1,253,625	1,797,989,603
山梨県	-	-	1,059,962	815,730	1,346,665
東京都	-	-	360,487	317,167	409,002
新潟県	-	-	200,854	174,436	203,613
富山県	-	-	222,068	189,901	245,792
石川県	-	-	154,848	158,608	161,955
福井県	-	-	125,944	114,124	133,301
長野県	-	-	244,589	251,661	299,664
岐阜県	-	-	322,918	275,215	346,870
静岡県	-	-	507,879	451,097	512,774
愛知県	-	-	806,306	680,080	996,401
三重県	-	-	243,494	223,833	282,099
滋賀県	-	-	200,482	157,293	208,451

京都府	-	-	274,439	239,263	324,922
大阪府	-	-	885,294	739,215	896,680
兵庫県	-	-	581,122	487,499	720,820
奈良県	-	-	186,575	150,923	220,417
和歌山県	-	-	137,065	137,617	184,861
鳥取県	-	-	99,819	95,555	115,477
島根県	-	-	162,538	148,998	157,895,896
岡山県	-	-	262,644	173,638	284,617
広島県	-	-	344,096	305,838	438,854
山口県	-	-	318,911	248,122	281,110
徳島県	-	-	108,755	118,674	111,547
香川県	-	-	152,917	162,688	183,656
愛媛県	-	-	232,420	189,486	232,283
高知県	-	-	94,055	94,608	104,556
福岡県	-	-	552,689	528,117	687,499
佐賀県	-	-	146,447	140,470	150,682
長崎県	-	-	217,300	207,335	222,481
熊本県	-	-	291,477	253,382	313,398
大分県	-	-	204,854	166,917	202,758
宮崎県	-	-	176,605	155,141	180,700
鹿児島県	-	-	324,904	288,295	317,063
沖縄県	-	-	130,453	93,385	140,235
計	16,943,425 (28.31%)	16,797,686,469 (30.03%)	16,544,761.1 (28.08%)	14,071,671.422 (24.07%)	18,460,335.204 (34.68%)
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (総務省) 『選挙関連資料』					

APPENDIX V. LDP's Member's List in the PARC & the Agricultural and Forestry Division & the Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee (2016)

自民党の役員表【政務調査会、農林部会、農林水産戦略調査会】(2016 年現在)				
	Position	Name	Classification of both Houses	Electoral district
政務調査会 (<i>Seimuchosakai</i>)	会長	稲田朋美	衆議院議員	福井県第 1 区
	会長代行	塩谷立	衆議院議員	静岡県第 8 区
	会長代理	田村憲久	衆議院議員	三重県第 4 区
		小野寺五典	衆議院議員	宮城県第 6 区
		新藤義孝	衆議院議員	埼玉県第 2 区
		松本純	衆議院議員	神奈川県第 1 区
		愛知治郎	参議院議員	宮城県
		野村哲郎	参議院議員	鹿児島県
	副会長	金子恭之	衆議院議員	熊本県第 5 区
		後藤茂之	衆議院議員	長野県第 4 区
		吉川貴盛	衆議院議員	北海道第 2 区
		永岡桂子	衆議院議員	茨城県第 7 区
		宮下一郎	衆議院議員	長野県第 5 区

農林部会 (Norin-Bukai)		藤井基之	参議院議員	比例代表
		上野見通子	参議院議員	栃木県
		石井正弘	参議院議員	岡山県
	部会長	小泉進次郎	衆議院議員	神奈川県第 11 区
	部会長代理	鈴木憲和	衆議院議員	山形県第 2 区
		福田達夫	衆議院議員	群馬県第 4 区
		山田俊勇	参議院議員	比例代表
	副部会長	井野俊郎	衆議院議員	群馬県第 2 区
		池田道孝	衆議院議員	中国ブロック
		今枝宗一郎	衆議院議員	愛知県第 14 区
		大野敬太郎	衆議院議員	香川県第 3 区
		小島敏文	衆議院議員	広島県第 6 区
		笹川博義	衆議院議員	群馬県第 3 区
		白須賀貴樹	衆議院議員	千葉県第 13 区
		田野瀬太道	衆議院議員	奈良県第 4 区
		武井俊輔	衆議院議員	宮崎県第 1 区
		武部新	衆議院議員	北海道第 12 区

		中川郁子	衆議院議員	北海道 第 11 区
		中谷真一	衆議院議員	南関東ブ ロック
		根本幸典	衆議院議員	愛知県 第 15 区
		福山守	衆議院議員	四国プロ ック
		村井英樹	衆議院議員	埼玉県 第 1 区
		渡辺孝一	衆議院議員	北海道ブ ロック
		熊谷大	参議院議員	宮城県
		古賀友一郎	参議院議員	長崎県
		上月良祐	参議院議員	茨城県
		高橋克法	参議院議員	栃木県
		中泉松司	参議院議員	秋田県
		馬場成志	参議院議員	熊本県
		舞立昇治	参議院議員	鳥取県
		牧野たかお	参議院議員	静岡県
		山田修路	参議院議員	石川県
		若林健太	参議院議員	長野県
農林水産戦略調 査会 (<i>Norinsuisan Senryaku- Chousakai</i>)	会長	西川公也	衆議院議員	栃木県 第 2 区
	顧問	河村建夫	衆議院議員	山口県 第 3 区
		鈴木俊一	衆議院議員	岩手県 第 2 区
		塩谷立	衆議院議員	静岡県 第 8 区
		林芳正	参議院議員	山口県

会長代理	宮腰光寛	衆議院議員	富山県 第2区
筆頭副会長	江藤拓	衆議院議員	宮崎県 第2区
副会長	今村雅弘	衆議院議員	九州プロ ック
	山本拓	衆議院議員	北陸信 越プロッ ク
	今津寛	衆議院議員	北海道 第6区
	金田勝年	衆議院議員	秋田県 第2区
	赤沢亮正	衆議院議員	鳥取県 第2区
	葉梨康弘	衆議院議員	茨城県 第3区
	金子原二郎	参議院議員	長崎県
	長谷川岳	参議院議員	北海道
幹事長	吉川貴盛	衆議院議員	北海道 第2区
事務局長	野村哲郎	参議院議員	鹿児島 県
農林水産貿易対策委員長	野村哲郎	参議院議員	鹿児島 県
農林水産貿易対策委員会事務 局長	松本洋平	衆議院議員	東京都 第19区
農林水産貿易対策委員会事務 局次長	井野俊郎	衆議院議員	群馬県 第2区
	吉川ゆうみ	参議院議員	三重県
農林水産流通・消費対策委員 長	山本拓	衆議院議員	北陸信 越プロッ ク

農林水産流通・消費対策委員会事務局長	中原八一	参議院議員	新潟県
農林水産流通・消費対策委員会事務局次長	穴見陽一	衆議院議員	大分県 第 1 区
	助田重義	衆議院議員	北陸信 越ブロッ ク
	前川恵	衆議院議員	東京プロ ック
農協改革等法案検討 PT 座長	吉川貴盛	衆議院議員	北海道 第 2 区
農協改革等法案検討 PT 座長 代理	野村哲郎	参議院議員	鹿児島 県
農協改革等法案検討 PT 事務 局長	小泉進次郎	衆議院議員	神奈川 県第 11 区
ロシア 200 海里・サケマス流し網 漁禁止による根室・釧路地域緊 急対策本部長	西川公也	衆議院議員	栃木県 第 2 区
ロシア 200 海里・サケマス流し網 漁禁止による根室・釧路地域緊 急対策本部幹事長	小野寺五典	衆議院議員	宮城県 第 6 区
ロシア 200 海里・サケマス流し網 漁禁止による根室・釧路地域緊 急対策本部事務局長	中川郁子	衆議院議員	北海道 第 11 区
農林水産災害対策 WT 座長	野村哲郎	参議院議員	鹿児島 県
農林水産災害対策 WT 事務局 長	上月良祐	参議院議員	茨城県
MAPT 座長	小野寺五典	衆議院議員	宮城県 第 6 区
MAPT 事務局長	山田修路	参議院議員	石川県
Source: LDP's Homepage (https://www.jimin.jp/member/officer/#tab_03)			

APPENDIXVI. National Impact Index of Japan's Agriculture Cooperatives in 2005-2014

*Bold type: Prefectures where Nokyo's influence is relatively strong

*Underlined type: Prefectures where Nokyo's influence is relatively weak

平成 17 年(2005)			
全国県	平成 17 年(2005) 農協組合員人口	全人口(単位 1,000 人)	農協の影響力
北海道	322,015	5,628	5.72
青森	109,311	1,437	7.6
岩手	182,619	1,385	13.18
宮城	180,122	2,360	8
秋田	150,948	1,146	13.17
山形	154,224	1,216	12.68
福島	239,254	2,091	11.44
茨城	219,478	2,975	7.37
栃木	164,559	2,017	8.15
群馬	171,234	2,024	8.46
<u>埼玉</u>	<u>283,625</u>	<u>7,054</u>	<u>4.68</u>
<u>千葉</u>	<u>269,838</u>	<u>6,056</u>	<u>4.45</u>
<u>東京</u>	<u>148,682</u>	<u>12,577</u>	<u>1.18</u>
<u>神奈川</u>	<u>236,550</u>	<u>8,792</u>	<u>2.69</u>
新潟	304,419	2,431	12.52
富山	141,953	1,112	12.76
石川	106,142	1,174	9.04
福井	92,384	822	11.23
山梨	91,741	885	10.36
長野	323,535	2,196	14.73
岐阜	311,914	2,107	14.8
静岡	392,506	3,792	10.35
<u>愛知</u>	<u>352,291</u>	<u>7,255</u>	<u>4.85</u>

三重	180,364	1,867	9.66
滋賀	123,272	1,380	8.93
京都	<u>113,618</u>	<u>2,648</u>	<u>4.29</u>
大阪	<u>206,686</u>	<u>8,817</u>	<u>2.34</u>
兵庫	358,340	5,591	6.4
奈良	82,809	1,421	5.82
和歌山	161,476	1,036	15.58
鳥取	75,568	607	12.44
島根	202,168	742	27.24
岡山	191,409	1,957	9.78
広島	393,068	2,877	13.66
山口	206,901	1,439	14.37
徳島	113,220	810	13.97
香川	141,137	1,012	13.94
愛媛	182,512	1,468	12.43
高知	118,438	796	14.87
福岡	270,052	5,050	5.34
佐賀	112,476	866	12.98
長崎	138,315	1,479	9.35
熊本	150,666	1,842	8.17
大分	122,590	1,210	10.13
宮崎	149,024	1,153	12.92
鹿児島	239,695	1,753	13.67
沖縄	117,162	1,362	8.6
計	9,101,310	127,768	7.12(平均)

平成 19 年(2007)			
全国県	平成 19 年(2007) 農協組合員人口	全人口(単位 1,000 人)	農協の影響力
北海道	321,522	5,570	5.77

青森県	106,471	1,407	7.56
岩手県	179,527	1,364	13.16
宮城県	178,269	2,347	8
秋田県	149,439	1,121	13.33
山形県	153,427	1,198	12.8
福島県	243,754	2,067	11.79
茨城県	220,296	2,969	7.41
栃木県	165,070	2,014	8.19
群馬県	172,403	2,016	8.55
埼玉県	<u>297,990</u>	<u>7,090</u>	<u>4.2</u>
千葉県	<u>270,851</u>	<u>6,098</u>	<u>4.44</u>
東京都	<u>180,622</u>	<u>12,758</u>	<u>1.41</u>
神奈川県	<u>271,058</u>	<u>8,880</u>	<u>3.05</u>
新潟県	304,603	2,405	12.66
富山県	141,861	1,106	12.82
石川県	105,239	1,170	8.99
福井県	92,558	816	11.34
山梨県	92,556	877	10.55
長野県	322,105	2,180	14.77
岐阜県	312,282	2,104	14.84
静岡県	406,723	3,801	10.7
愛知県	388,354	7,360	5.27
三重県	180,808	1,876	9.63
滋賀県	129,229	1,396	9.25
京都府	<u>114,627</u>	<u>2,635</u>	<u>4.35</u>
大阪府	<u>231,296</u>	<u>8,812</u>	<u>2.62</u>
兵庫県	394,679	5,589	7.06
奈良県	87,509	1,410	6.2
和歌山県	163,120	1,019	16
鳥取県	76,319	600	12.71
島根県	216,840	731	29.66

岡山県	191,799	1,953	9.82
広島県	403,553	2,873	14.04
山口県	208,097	1,474	14.11
徳島県	111,955	800	13.99
香川県	138,018	1,006	13.71
愛媛県	185,553	1,452	12.77
高知県	120,204	782	15.37
福岡県	284,582	5,056	5.62
佐賀県	113,298	859	13.18
長崎県	137,233	1,453	9.44
熊本県	150,765	1,828	8.24
大分県	124,599	1,203	10.35
宮崎県	149,435	1,143	13.07
鹿児島県	235,833	1,730	13.63
沖縄県	117,360	1,373	8.54
計	9,343,691	127,771	7.31(平均)

平成 21 年(2009)			
全国県	平成 21 年(2009) 農協組合員人口	全人口(単位 1,000 人)	農協の影響力
北海道	327,697	5,507	5.95
青森県	102,878	1,379	7.46
岩手県	175,035	1,340	13.06
宮城県	176,951	2,336	8
秋田県	147,013	1,096	13.41
山形県	152,555	1,179	12.93
福島県	250,430	2,040	12.27
茨城県	221,060	2,960	7.46
栃木県	169,056	2,006	8.42
群馬県	172,617	2,007	8.6

埼玉県	<u>305,947</u>	<u>7,130</u>	<u>4.29</u>
千葉県	<u>267,369</u>	<u>6,139</u>	<u>4.35</u>
東京都	<u>187,461</u>	<u>12,868</u>	<u>1.45</u>
神奈川県	<u>287,109</u>	<u>8,943</u>	<u>3.21</u>
新潟県	303,889	2,378	12.77
富山県	141,192	1,095	12.89
石川県	105,244	1,165	9.03
福井県	92,920	808	11.5
山梨県	92,876	867	10.71
長野県	322,592	2,159	14.94
岐阜県	311,573	2,092	14.89
静岡県	406,916	3,792	10.73
愛知県	407,487	7,418	5.49
三重県	184,234	1,870	9.85
滋賀県	131,081	1,405	9.32
京都府	<u>114,731</u>	<u>2,622</u>	<u>4.37</u>
大阪府	<u>245,428</u>	<u>8,801</u>	<u>2.78</u>
兵庫県	417,971	5,583	7.48
奈良県	94,461	1,399	6.75
和歌山県	163,336	1,004	16.26
鳥取県	78,373	591	13.26
島根県	220,846	718	30.75
岡山県	193,055	1,942	9.94
広島県	407,201	2,863	14.22
山口県	209,544	1,455	19.96
徳島県	110,946	789	14.06
香川県	140,704	999	14.08
愛媛県	188,028	1,436	13.09
高知県	121,672	766	15.88
福岡県	296,088	5,053	5.85
佐賀県	114,500	852	13.43

長崎県	147,690	1,430	10.32
熊本県	154,527	1,814	8.51
大分県	123,084	1,195	10.29
宮崎県	152,304	1,132	13.45
鹿児島県	230,873	1,708	13.51
沖縄県	119,469	1,382	8.64
計	9,488,013	127,510	7.44(平均)

平成 22 年(2010)			
全国県	平成 22 年(2010) 農協組合員人口	全人口(単位 1,000 人)	農協の影響力
北海道	330,282	5,506	5.99
青森	100,678	1,373	7.33
岩手	172,409	1,330	12.96
宮城	176,913	2,348	8
秋田	146,054	1,086	13.44
山形	152,204	1,169	13.02
福島	251,049	2,029	12.37
茨城	223,940	2,970	7.54
栃木	171,074	2,008	8.51
群馬	173,524	2,008	8.64
埼玉	<u>309,127</u>	<u>7,195</u>	<u>4.31</u>
千葉	<u>266,669</u>	<u>6,216</u>	<u>4.29</u>
東京	<u>192,094</u>	<u>13,159</u>	<u>1.45</u>
神奈川	<u>298,837</u>	<u>9,048</u>	<u>3.3</u>
新潟	305,423	2,374	12.86
富山	140,604	1,093	12.86
石川	106,325	1,170	9.08
福井	94,883	806	11.77
山梨	92,992	863	10.77

長野	323,626	2,152	15.03
岐阜	311,473	2,081	14.96
静岡	411,659	3,765	10.93
愛知	417,300	7,411	5.63
三重	187,664	1,855	10.11
滋賀	132,788	1,411	9.41
京都	115,353	2,636	4.37
大阪	253,202	8,865	2.85
兵庫	427,276	5,588	7.64
奈良	100,297	1,401	7.15
和歌山	177,048	1,002	17.66
鳥取	78,782	589	13.37
島根	225,058	717	31.38
岡山	194,512	1,945	10
広島	406,036	2,861	14.19
山口	215,334	1,451	14.84
徳島	109,991	785	14.01
香川	139,303	996	13.98
愛媛	189,098	1,431	13.21
高知	121,649	764	15.92
福岡	308,278	5,072	6.07
佐賀	116,591	850	13.71
長崎	149,304	1,427	10.46
熊本	157,334	1,817	8.65
大分	122,861	1,197	10.26
宮崎	152,939	1,135	13.47
鹿児島	229,254	1,706	13.43
沖縄	121,094	1,393	8.69
計	9,600,185	128,057	7.49(平均)

平成 24 年(2012)			
全国県	平成 24 年(2012) 農協組合員人口	20 歳以上 全人口(単位 1,000 人)	農協の影響力
北海	327,697	5,507	5.95
青森	102,878	1,379	7.46
岩手	175,035	1,340	13.06
宮城	176,951	2,336	8
秋田	147,013	1,096	13.41
山形	152,555	1,179	12.93
福島	250,430	2,040	12.27
茨城	221,060	2,960	7.46
栃木	169,056	2,006	8.42
群馬	172,617	2,007	8.6
<u>埼玉</u>	<u>305,947</u>	<u>7,130</u>	<u>4.29</u>
<u>千葉</u>	<u>267,369</u>	<u>6,139</u>	<u>4.35</u>
<u>東京</u>	<u>187,461</u>	<u>12,868</u>	<u>1.45</u>
<u>神奈川</u>	<u>287,109</u>	<u>8,943</u>	<u>3.21</u>
新潟	303,889	2,378	12.77
富山	141,192	1,095	12.89
石川	105,244	1,165	9.03
福井	92,920	808	11.5
山梨	92,876	867	10.71
長野	322,592	2,159	14.94
岐阜	311,573	2,092	14.89
静岡	406,916	3,792	10.73
愛知	407,487	7,418	5.49
三重	184,234	1,870	9.85
滋賀	131,081	1,405	9.32
<u>京都</u>	<u>114,731</u>	<u>2,622</u>	<u>4.37</u>
<u>大阪</u>	<u>245,428</u>	<u>8,801</u>	<u>2.78</u>
兵庫	417,971	5,583	7.48

奈良	94,461	1,399	6.75
和歌山	163,336	1,004	16.26
鳥取	78,373	591	13.26
島根	220,846	718	30.75
岡山	193,055	1,942	9.94
広島	407,201	2,863	14.22
山口	209,544	1,455	14.4
徳島	110,946	789	14.06
香川	140,704	999	14.08
愛媛	188,028	1,436	13.09
高知	121,672	766	15.88
福岡	296,088	5,053	5.85
佐賀	114,500	852	13.43
長崎	147,690	1,430	10.32
熊本	152,527	1,814	8.68
大分	123,084	1,195	10.29
宮崎	152,304	1,132	13.45
鹿児島	230,873	1,708	13.51
沖縄	119,469	1,382	8.64
計	9,488,013	127,510	7.36(平均)

平成 26 年(2014)			
全国県	平成 26 年(2014) 農協組合員人口	20 歳以上 全人口(単位 1,000 人)	農協の影響力
北海道	344,670	4,541	7.59
青森	98,023	1,103	8.88
岩手	167,532	1,068	15.69
宮城	181,595	1,921	9
秋田	145,025	880	16.48
山形	150,913	937	16.1

福島	255,374	1,596	16
茨城	230,856	2,402	9.61
栃木	172,505	1,630	10.58
群馬	180,920	1,619	11.17
<u>埼玉</u>	<u>335,737</u>	<u>5,963</u>	<u>5.63</u>
<u>千葉</u>	<u>264,141</u>	<u>5,133</u>	<u>5.14</u>
<u>東京</u>	<u>211,611</u>	<u>11,327</u>	<u>1.86</u>
<u>神奈川</u>	<u>336,909</u>	<u>7,511</u>	<u>4.48</u>
新潟	316,467	1,920	16.48
富山	141,194	886	15.93
石川	120,676	947	12.74
福井	113,648	645	17.61
山梨	94,251	692	13.62
長野	321,505	1,729	18.59
岐阜	322,259	1,664	19.36
静岡	540,368	2,884	18.73
<u>愛知</u>	<u>199,057</u>	<u>6,046</u>	<u>3.29</u>
三重	199,057	1,494	13.32
滋賀	145,546	1,135	12.82
<u>京都</u>	<u>135,960</u>	<u>2,162</u>	<u>6.28</u>
<u>大阪</u>	<u>301,740</u>	<u>7,290</u>	<u>4.13</u>
兵庫	475,387	4,538	10.47
奈良	100,411	1,132	8.87
和歌山	188,545	805	23.42
鳥取	81,176	473	17.16
島根	229,501	2,150	10.67
岡山	203,668	1,575	12.93
広島	420,917	2,320	18.14
山口	224,804	1,171	19.19
徳島	108,538	637	17.03
香川	133,357	808	16.5

愛媛	215,509	1,155	18.65
高知	120,892	617	19.59
福岡	337,233	4,163	8.1
佐賀	117,209	673	17.41
長崎	154,778	1,138	13.6
熊本	160,987	1,463	11
大分	125,454	968	12.96
宮崎	152,290	906	16.8
鹿児島	230,852	1,363	16.93
沖縄	128,376	1,091	11.76
計	10,171,350	106,271	9.57(平均)

APPENDIXVII. Prefectures with Strong Influence of Nokyo & LDP in the Agricultural Regions seen in General Elections.

*Underlined type: LDP's sudden lost through general elections in the constituencies where Nokyo and LDP's influence are regarded as traditionally strong.

2000 年代自民党の衆議院議員選挙結果 (小選挙区)										
	第 43 回 (2003 年)		第 44 回 (2005 年)		第 45 回 (2009 年)		第 46 回 (2012 年)		第 47 回 (2014 年)	
区 分	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数	当選人 数 (定 数)	得票 数
秋 田 県	1(3)	226, 749	1(3)	236,3 09	0(3)	244,9 27	3(3)	262,2 67	3(3)	242,5 30
山 形 県	2(3)	225, 355	<u>0(3)</u>	<u>427,6</u> <u>02</u>	1(3)	316,4 08	2(3)	273,2 16	3(3)	276,2 95
福 島 県	3(5)	480, 806	2(5)	560,5 60.46	<u>0(5)</u>	<u>443,2</u> <u>97.39</u>	4(5)	402,1 35	3(5)	371,3 52
新 潟 県	2(6)	510, 524	3(6)	622,4 14	<u>0(6)</u>	<u>513,5</u> <u>95</u>	6(6)	530,5 05	5(6)	479,5 15
富 山 県	3(3)	329, 319	0(3)	291,2 56	2(3)	322,1 83	3(3)	335,4 10	3(3)	291,9 74
福 井 県	3(3)	203, 369	<u>0(3)</u>	<u>240,9</u> <u>38</u>	3(3)	239,7 26	3(3)	213,6 96	2(2)	199,9 41
山 梨 県	2(3)	230, 116	1(3)	179,5 65	<u>0(3)</u>	<u>163,1</u> <u>65</u>	1(3)	160,1 32	<u>0(2)</u>	<u>169,1</u> <u>35</u>

長野 県 岐阜 県 静岡 県 和歌 山 県	3(5)	474, 370	2(5)	538,3 39	<u>0(5)</u>	<u>464,9</u> <u>31</u>	3(5)	402,7 99	3(5)	360,4 30
	5(5)	593, 418	<u>0(5)</u>	<u>532,0</u> <u>57</u>	2(5)	576,6 61	5(5)	546,4 91	5(5)	492,7 95
	4(8)	772, 857	2(8)	1,000 ,366	<u>0(8)</u>	<u>802,7</u> <u>19</u>	6(8)	796,5 20	6(8)	835,0 89
	2(3)	178, 704	<u>0(3)</u>	<u>335,5</u> <u>18</u>	1(3)	260,6 89	2(3)	246,1 50	2(3)	239,3 61
鳥 取 県 島 根 県 広 島 県	1(2)	160, 183	<u>0(2)</u>	<u>170,9</u> <u>37</u>	2(2)	202,7 80	2(2)	212,1 41	2(2)	169,6 84
	2(2)	263, 452	<u>0(2)</u>	<u>252,5</u> <u>19</u>	2(2)	257,8 91	2(2)	247,8 75	2(2)	223,9 60
	6(7)	608, 506	<u>0(7)</u>	<u>660,6</u> <u>12</u>	1(7)	673,7 97	6(7)	665,1 96	6(7)	636,8 43
山 口 県	3(4)	480, 922	<u>0(4)</u>	<u>509,3</u> <u>47</u>	3(4)	485,1 65.12	4(4)	466,0 65	4(4)	410,9 60.78 4
徳 島 県 香 川 県	2(3)	202, 679	1(3)	187,1 19	1(3)	189,7 91	3(3)	197,9 54	2(2)	178,1 45
	3(3)	249, 471	<u>0(3)</u>	<u>312,1</u> <u>12</u>	1(3)	244,2 45	2(3)	214,5 73	2(3)	207,7 14

愛媛県 高知県	4(4)	404,136	<u>0(4)</u>	<u>461.1</u> <u>11</u>	3(4)	378,182.80	4(4)	329,654.71	4(4)	288,951.292
	3(3)	200,023	<u>0(3)</u>	<u>197.8</u> <u>36</u>	3(3)	194,111	3(3)	201,236	2(2)	162,043
佐賀県 長崎県 大分県 宮崎県 鹿児島県	2(3)	276,837	0(3)	<u>168.6</u> <u>74</u>	<u>1(3)</u>	<u>248.3</u> <u>99</u>	3(3)	237,858	1(2)	197,495
	3(4)	395,857	1(4)	406,381	<u>0(4)</u>	<u>364.2</u> <u>47.00</u>	4(4)	337,746	4(4)	306,493
	2(3)	349,021	<u>1(3)</u>	<u>290.0</u> <u>68</u>	<u>0(3)</u>	<u>300.5</u> <u>81</u>	3(3)	380,120	2(3)	281,127
	1(3)	99,969	<u>0(3)</u>	<u>265.5</u> <u>38</u>	<u>2(3)</u>	<u>252.4</u> <u>75</u>	3(3)	310,998	3(3)	309,072
	4(5)	506,230	<u>0(5)</u>	<u>442.6</u> <u>52</u>	<u>3(5)</u>	<u>493.6</u> <u>84</u>	4(5)	458,913.99	4(5)	404,265.679
計	237(300)	26,089,327	52(300)	32,518,389.92	64(300)	27,301,982.07	237(300)	25,643,309.44	222(295)	25,461,448.922
		43.85%		47.70%		38.68%		43.01%		48.10%
Notes: This table shows 「農業地域の中で、農協力の強い地方」 modified by author. Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (総務省) 『選挙関連資料』										

APPENDIXⅧ. Cases of 1% Majority between Two Candidates in House of Representative Elections (SMD) in Last Four General Elections

2005年 第44回衆議院選挙 【得票差1%内で当落が決まった候補者リスト】				
北海道第2区				
当落	氏名	政党	職業	得票数
落	吉川貴盛	自由民主党	自由民主党北海道第2選挙区支部長	127,031
当	三井わきお	民主党	政党役員	129,357
北海道第6区				
当	佐々木隆博	民主党	政党役員	143,860
落	金田英行	自由民主党	自由民主党北海道第6選挙区支部長	141,099
宮城県第1区				
落	郡和子	民主党	会社員	115,264
当	土井亨	自由民主党	自由民主党宮城県第1選挙区支部長	117,236
群馬県第2区				
当	笹川堯	自由民主党	団体役員	99,919.515
落	石関貴史	民主党	政党役員	98,497.479
埼玉県第6区				
当	大島敦	民主党	政党役員	123,159
落	中根一幸	自由民主党	政党役員	121,665
山梨県第2区				
当	堀内光雄	無所属	富士急行株式会社取締役会長	63,758
落	長崎幸太郎	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	62,821
滋賀県第3区				
落	宇野治	自由民主党	当選挙区支部長	74,006
当	三日月大造	民主党	政党役員	73,272
京都府第3区				

落	清水鴻一郎	自由民主党	医師	91,429
当	泉健太	民主党	民主党総支部長	92,249
京都府第4区				
当	中川泰宏	自由民主党	J A 京都中央会長	75,192
落	北神圭郎	民主党	政党役員	73,550
大阪府第17区				
当	岡下信子	自由民主党	無職	90,765
落	西村真悟	民主党	弁護士	89,276
山口県第2区				
当	福田良彦	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	104,322
落	平岡秀夫	民主党	弁護士	103,734
福岡県第11区				
落	山本幸三	自由民主党	自由民主党福岡県衆議院選挙区支部長	78,308
当	武田良太	無所属	政党役員	78,757

2009年 第45回衆議院選挙 【得票差1%内で当落が決まった候補者リスト】				
北海道第7区				
当落	氏名	政党	職業	得票数
落	仲野博子	民主党	政党役員	99,236
当	伊東良孝	自由民主党	自由民主党北海道第7選挙区支部長	100,150
青森県第3区				
当	大島理森	自由民主党	農業	90,176
落	田名部匡代	民主党	政党役員	89,809
山形県第1区				
当	鹿野道彦	民主党	政党役員	106,202
落	遠藤利明	自由民主党	団体役員	104,911
神奈川県第2区				

当	菅義偉	自由民主党	自由民主党神奈川県第2選挙区支部長	132,270
落	三村和也	民主党	政党役員	131,722
神奈川県第13区				
当	橘秀徳	民主党	政党役員	138,104
落	甘利明	自由民主党	内閣府特命担当大臣	98,595
福井県第2区				
落	糸川正晃	民主党	会社役員	78,496
当	山本拓	自由民主党	政党役員	80,033
奈良県第4区				
当	田野瀬良太郎	自由民主党	自由民主党奈良県支部連合会会長	95,638
落	大西孝典	民主党	政党役員	93,803
鳥取県第2区				
落	湯原俊二	民主党	農業	99,260
当	赤沢亮正	自由民主党	自由民主党選挙区支部長	84,659
徳島県第3区				
当	後藤田正純	自由民主党	自由民主党徳島県第3選挙区支部長	81,581
落	仁木博文	民主党	医師	80,359

2012年 第46回衆議院選挙 【得票差1%内で当落が決まった候補者リスト】				
埼玉県第6区				
当落	氏名	政党	職業	得票数
落	大島敦	民主党	総務副大臣	90,673
当	中根一幸	自由民主党	専修大学外部講師	90,871
東京都第1区				
当	山田美樹	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	82,013
落	海江田万里	民主党	経済評論家	80,879
東京都第3区				

落	松原仁	民主党	政党役員	120,298
当	石原宏高	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	122,314
山梨県第3区				
落	中谷真一	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	50,190
当	後藤斎	民主党	政党役員	50,362.785
愛知県第13区				
当	大見正	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	98,670
落	大西健介	民主党	政党役員	97,187
京都府第3区				
落	泉健太	民主党	政党役員	58,735
当	宮崎謙介	自由民主党	会社顧問	58,951
和歌山県第1区				
当	岸本周平	民主党	経済産業大臣政務官	60,577
落	門博文	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	60,277

2014年 第47回衆議院選挙【得票差1%内で当落が決まった候補者リスト】				
北海道第7区				
当落	氏名	政党	職業	得票数
落	鈴木貴子	民主党	政党役員	72,056
当	伊東良孝	自由民主党	自由民主党北海道第7選挙区支部支部長	72,281
福島県第4区				
落	菅家一郎	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	56,440
当	小熊慎司	維新の党	政党役員	56,856
東京都第21区				
落	長島昭久	民主党	政党役員	82,351
当	小田原潔	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	83,984
神奈川県第12区				
当	星野剛士	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	83,327

落	阿部知子	民主党	小児科医師	82,612
神奈川県第16区				
当	後藤祐一	民主党	政党役員	103,116
落	義家弘介	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	101,627
新潟県第2区				
当	細田健一	自由民主党	選挙区支部長	70,589
落	鷲尾英一郎	民主党	公認会計士	70,487
山梨県第1区				
当	中島克仁	民主党	医師	102,111
落	宮川典子	自由民主党	自由民主党山梨県 第1選挙区支部支 部長	101,026

**APPENDIXIX. The Members' List of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
Standing Committee in both the House of Representatives and the House of
Councilors**

衆議院内農林水産委員会委員名簿 (2016 年 6 月現在)		
役職	氏名	会派
委員長	小里 泰弘	自民
理事	江藤 拓	自民
理事	小泉 進次郎	自民
理事	武部 新	自民
理事	宮腰 光寛	自民
理事	築 和生	自民
委員	あべ 俊子	自民
委員	井野 俊郎	自民
委員	伊藤 信太郎	自民
委員	池田 道孝	自民
委員	今枝 宗一郎	自民
委員	加藤 寛治	自民
委員	勝沼 栄明	自民
委員	瀬戸 隆一	自民
委員	中川 郁子	自民
委員	中谷 真一	自民
委員	西川 公也	自民
委員	橋本 英教	自民

委員	古川 康	自民
委員	細田 健一	自民
委員	前川 恵	自民
委員	宮路 拓馬	自民
委員	山本 拓	自民
委員	吉川 貴盛	自民
委員	渡辺 孝一	自民
Source: 衆議院ホームページ http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/index.nsf/html/index.htm		

参議院内農林水産委員会委員名簿 (2016 年 6 月現在)		
役職	氏名	会派
委員長	若林 健太	自民
理事	山田 修路	自民
理事	山田 俊勇	自民
	熊谷 大	自民
	高橋 克法	自民
	中泉 松司	自民
	野村 哲郎	自民
	長谷川 岳	自民
	馬場 成志	自民
	舞立 昇治	自民
	山崎 力	自民
Source: 参議院ホームページ http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/konkokkai/current/list/10070.htm		

APPENDIX X. The List of Agriculture-Related Diet Members in the LDP

(Dual-office holding between LDP and the Diet)

自民党内の農林関係議員(関連部会、委員会所属、農林省出身など) (2016 年現在)			
【農林部会】			
氏名	区分	選挙区	農林関係所属・出身・職責など主な特徴
野村哲郎	衆議院	鹿児島県	昭和 44 年 鹿児島県農協中央会入会、参事・常務等を歴任 平成 16 年 参議院議員選挙で鹿児島選挙区から立候補し初当選 農林水産大臣政務官、参議院農林水産委員長、自民党水産部会長、 自民党畜産・酪農対策小委員会委員長、自民党政務調査会会長代理、 参議院農林水産委員、自民党農林水産貿易対策委員長
金子恭之	衆議院	熊本県第 5 区	農林水産大臣政務官就任(平成 17 年第三次小泉内閣)
吉川貴盛	衆議院	北海道	農林水産委員会筆頭理事、農林水産戦略調査会幹事長、農林水産副大臣(平成25年)
永岡桂子	衆議院	茨城県第 7 区	農林水産大臣政務官、自民党政調・農林部会、畜産・酪農対策副委員長
宮下一郎	衆議院	長野県第 5 区	衆議院農林水産委員会理事
小泉進次郎	衆議院	神奈川県第 11 区	党農林部会長

鈴木憲和	衆議院	山形県第2区	党農林部会長代理、元農林水産省職員
福田達夫	衆議院	群馬県第4区	党農林水産関係団体委員長、党農林部会長代理
山田俊男	参議院	比例代表	党農林部会長代理、党 SC 農林水産大臣(農林)、全国農業協同組合中央会専務理事、全国農業協同組合中央会常務理事
武部新	衆議院	北海道第12区	農林水産委員会理事、沖縄及び北方問題に関する特別委員会理事、環太平洋パートナーシップ協定等に関する特別委員会(TPP特別委員会)、水産部会部会長代理、農林部会副部会長、農林水産関係団体委員会副委員長
中川郁子	衆議院	北海道第11区	農林水産大臣政務官
中谷真一	衆議院	南関東ブロック	党農林部会副部会長、衆議院農林水産委員会委員
村井英樹	衆議院	埼玉県第1区	農林水産省畜産部畜産企画課係長(農林水産省畜産部)
高橋克法	参議院	栃木県	農林水産委員会委員
中泉	参議院	秋田県	参議院農林水産委員会委員、党農林部会副部会長、党農林水産関係団体副委員長、農家出身

松 司			
馬 場 成 志	参 議 院	熊本県	党農林部会副部長、参議院農林水産委員会委員
舞 立 昇 治	参 議 院	鳥取県	参議院農林水産委員会、党農林部会副部長、党農林水産関係団体副委員長
山 田 修 路	参 議 院	石川県	参議院農林水産委員会筆頭理事、党農林水産関係団体委員会副委員長、農林水産省農林水産審議官、農林水産省水産庁長官、農林水産省農村振興局長
若 林 健 太	参 議 院	長野県	農林水産大臣秘書官、参議院農林水産委員長、農林水産関係団体副委員長
今 枝 宗 一 郎	衆 議 院	愛知県第 14 区	党農林部会副部長、衆議院農林水産委員
渡 部 孝 一	衆 議 院	北海道ブロック	党農林部会副部長、衆議院農林水産委員会理事
古 賀 友 一 郎	参 議 院	長崎県	党農林部会副部長、参議院農林水産委員会委員
【農林水産戦略調査会】			
氏 名	区 分	選挙区	農林関係所属・出身・職責など主な特徴

西川公也	衆議院	栃木県第2区	農林水産大臣、衆議院農林水産常任委員会委員長、自由民主党農業基本政策委員会委員長、自由民主党農林部会長
林芳正	参議院	山口県	党農林水産戦略調査会会長、農林水産大臣
宮腰光寛	衆議院	富山県第2区	党 SC 農林水産大臣(農林)、衆議院農林水産委員長、党食育調査会副会長、農林水産副大臣
江藤拓	衆議院	宮崎県第2区	農林水産副大臣、農林水産大臣政務官、党農林部会長代理、衆議院農林水産委員会理事
今村雅弘	衆議院	九州ブロック	農林水産副大臣、党農林部会長
山本拓	衆議院	北陸信越ブロック	党 農林水産流通・消費対策委員長、農林水産副大臣
金田勝年	衆議院	秋田県第2区	農林水産政務次官
葉梨康弘	衆議院	茨城県第3区	党農林部会長代理
長谷川岳	参議院	北海道	自民党水産部会長、TPP 総合対策実行本部幹事、農林水産戦略調査会副会長

前 川 恵	衆 議 院	東京ブロック	衆議院農林水産委員会委員
上 月 良 祐	参 議 院	茨城県	党 農林部会副部長
<p>Note: Those who have irrelevant to agriculture-related career or overlapping membership between committees are omitted from the chart.</p> <p>Source: 自民党ホームページ (https://www.jimin.jp/)</p>			

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논문 초록

2003년 12월에 개시한 한일FTA 협상은 지난 2012년 6월 제3차 실무협의를 마지막으로 중단되어 안타깝게도 2016년 현재에 이르기까지 더 이상의 진전된 모습을 보여주지 못하고 있다. 협상 중단으로부터 무려 4년이라는 시간이 흐르고 있는 이 시점에서, 한국과 일본이 과거 협상과정을 돌아보면서 주목해야할 점은 무엇이고, 앞으로 이 정체된 한일FTA 협상 타결의 실마리가 되어줄 열쇠는 어디에 있을까. 앞서 일본은 2000년대부터 본격적으로 글로벌 시장에 대비한 무역 자유화를 향한 움직임을 활발히 보이기 시작했다. 최근에 아베 내각의 ‘신국가전략’으로서의 FTA 이니셔티브와 한국의 전통적인 적극적 FTA 정책기조는 중단된 한일FTA의 경우와는 대비되는 흐름을 보여준다. 본 논문은 어떠한 장애물들이 한일FTA 협상의 진전을 가로막고 있는 것인지, 특히 그 원인이 일본사회 국내의 정치적인 제약에 있는 것인지, 아니면 경제적인 제약에서 나오는 것인지 확인해보고자 한다.

먼저, 한일FTA 협상과정에서의 현 장애물 요건들을 검토해보고, 합의에 이르기까지 큰 장애요인이 되고 있는 일본의 국내정치적 요인에 대해서 자세히 분석해보고자 한다. 많은 학자들이 주지하고 있듯이, 비경쟁 산업 부문에 관한 이슈와 정당(또는 정치인)과 관료, 이익단체가 만들어내는 ‘철의 삼각’ 또는 ‘삼자 동맹’ 관계로 대표되는 일본의 국내 FTA 정치적 특성은 한일FTA 논의에 있어서 강력한 국내적 장애물이 되어왔다. 그렇다면, 한일

FTA 협상과정에서 나타나는 ‘철의 삼각형’ 동맹이 발휘하는 영향력을 어떻게 설명할 수 있을까. 이러한 요인들은 실질적으로 어떠한 방식으로 무역협상과정에서 충돌을 불러일으키고 있는 것일까. 본 연구는 일본의 국내 정책형성과정에 중점을 두고, 무역협상과정에서 대표적 반대자인 일본 농업분야 내 ‘철의 삼각형’ 동맹의 상호작용의 예시들을 분석해보고자 한다. 즉, 정제된 한일FTA 협상의 열쇠를 2000년대에 들어선 최근 약 10년간의 일본의 농업정치가 보여주는 상호작용의 자취에서 찾아보고자 한다. 이렇게 함으로써 본 논문은 이 분야에서 드물게 다뤄진 장기화된 FTA 협상의 원인과 일본의 농업정치 이슈를 연계하여 분석하는데 의의를 둔다.

아직 한일 양국이 FTA 협상타결까지 가야할 길은 멀어 보이지만, 그렇다고 한일FTA의 미래가 어둡다고만 하기에는 일본 국내정치에 새로운 변화가능성들이 내재되어 있다는 점을 알아야한다. 가장 두드러지게, 최근의 아베 내각 하의 대외경제정책의 움직임은 양자 또는 다자간 경제협력의 참여에 큰 관심을 보여주고 있다. 또한, 아베 수상은 농협의 영향력을 줄이는 등 일본의 농업 정치에 상당한 개혁을 추진하고 있으며, 현재까지 농협의 극심한 반대에도 불구하고 이 계획을 성공적으로 이끌고 있다. 하지만, 주목해야 할 점은 이러한 노력들이 아직 한일FTA 이슈에는 무관한 얘기라는 점으로 보인다는 것이다. 즉, 농업 분야에서 보여주는 정치인, 관료, 이익집단이 이루는 조직정치의 힘은 아직 유효하다고 할 수 있다. 이 모든 어려움에도 불구하고 앞으로 양국의 리더들이 한일FTA를 타결시킨다면, 이는 한일 관계에

있어서 외교적 충돌 등으로 인한 경색되지 않는 유연한 정치협력의 길과 동아시아 경제협력모델 형성에 새로운 모멘텀이 되어줄 것이다.

키워드: 한일FTA, 일본의 FTA정치, 철의 삼각형, 농업정치, 자민당, 농림수산성, 농협, 분절된 조합주의, 조직적 표.